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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Lawmakers use law not only to order and empower, but to exhort and persuade.  
To paraphrase Richard E. Neustadt, the power to make law is no greater than the 
power to persuade people to comply with it.1  This Article introduces a new concept 
of law’s motivational functions and the laws that serve those functions, which I call 
“motivational law.”2  One law may possess the function of motivating people to 
comply with another law.  Even laws that are not primarily motivational frequently 
are couched in exhortative or persuasive rhetoric to increase compliance, or to give 
the impression that they will have that effect. 
Motivational law is found in the requirement of consideration for contract 
formation, obscenity laws, censorship laws, religious laws on diet, dress and ritual, 
military regulations, and in a host of other contexts.  Even due process has a 
motivational function.  Rules of procedure may or may not result in just outcomes, 
but the appearance of fairness with which they clothe the judicial system motivates 
citizens to accept those outcomes and obey judicial orders.3   
“Soft law”4 lies at the heart of New Governance5 theory, and it, too, is 
                                                                
1RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE POLICIES OF LEADERSHIP 10 (John 
Wiley & Sons 4th ed., Columbia Univ. 1960). (Presidential power is the “power to persuade . . 
. .”).  Alexander Bickel made a similar comment on the power of the judiciary.  A court 
opinion, like poetry, he said, “makes nothing happen.”  ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST 
DANGEROUS BRANCH 245.(Yale Univ. Press 2nd ed. 1962). 
2The concept of motivational law builds on ideas in my book on Jewish liturgical law and 
practice, ARNOLD S. ROSENBERG, JEWISH LITURGY AS A SPIRITUAL SYSTEM (1997).  In the 
book I explored the motivational purposes of Jewish liturgy and ritual, and the historical and 
textual evidence of those purposes.  I wish to thank my colleagues Eric Mitnick, Linda Keller 
and the other members of the Junior Faculty Writing Group at Thomas Jefferson School of 
Law for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. 
3See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990). 
4“In its broadest scope, the formula `soft law’ labels those regulatory instruments and 
mechanisms of governance that, while implicating some kind of normative commitment, do 
not rely on binding rules or a regime of formal sanctions.”  Anna Di Robilant, Genealogies of 
Soft Law, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 499, 499 (2006).  “Advocates of soft law claim that social 
integration is best effected through multilevel decentralized processes resulting in open-ended 
and flexible guidelines and standards.  Conversely, defenders of hard law insist that social 
policies must be pursued through a centralized, vertical and formal decision-making process 
yielding uniform and binding rules creating justiciable rights.”  Id. at 505.  See also Louise G. 
Trubek, Public Interest Lawyers and New Governance: Advocating for Health Care, 2002 
WIS. L. REV. 575, 600 (2002) (“Soft law is a term used to refer to guidelines, 
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motivational law.  People are more likely to be motivated to comply with rules that 
govern their conduct if those rules are formulated with their participation and 
enforced by persuasion rather than threats.6  If a spoonful of sugar makes the 
medicine of regulation go down, a rule that compels a regulator to administer that 
spoonful of sugar, or a principle that exhorts the regulated to swallow it, is 
motivational law. 
Motivational law sometimes lacks a clear connection to its intended impact on 
compliance, and the disconnect may cause societal tension.  Social scientists never 
found a clear connection between obscenity laws and compliance with laws against 
rape and sexual abuse.7  Numerous efforts by social scientists to prove that religious 
motivational laws (e.g., “go to church on Sunday”) motivate people to comply with 
laws against crimes involving violence or dishonesty have produced inconsistent 
results.  As discussed further in this Article, to the extent motivational law succeeds 
in motivating compliance with other laws, that success frequently depends on peer 
group influence.  
Motivational law has a dark side.  It possesses an inherently conservative 
tendency that aids regimes and other authorities in asserting their power and resisting 
legal and social change.  However, those who challenge a regime or authority may 
set up a competing motivational law.  Conflicting motivational laws frequently mark 
the fault lines of legal and social conflict. 
After defining the concept of motivational law and giving several examples in 
Parts II.A and II.B, I discuss in Part II.C how motivational law fits into theories of 
law.  In Part II.D, I explore the boundaries of motivational law and what it means to 
say that a law is “motivational.”  Part III.A examines motivational law as a type of 
intrinsic social control, and Part III.B explains how motivational law works through 
moral community-building, naming and shaming, cognitive dissonance and cognitive 
biases.  Part IV.A asks why motivational law often fails, IV.B looks at the equivocal 
evidence of the efficacy of religious motivational law in preventing delinquency, and 
in IV.C I take a look on the dark side at the sad instances where motivational law 
                                                           
recommendations, policy suggestions, and other government systems designed to influence 
behavior without imposing formal legal obligations.”).  
5See infra note 12. 
6This is what Orly Lobel seems to mean when she asserts that “`soft’ does not mean 
`voluntary.’”  Orly Lobel, Surreply: Setting the Agenda for New Governance Research, 89 
MINN. L. REV. 498, 506 (2004).  If an environmental regulatory agency obtains the 
participation of regulated businesses in formulating pollution control regulations, the resulting 
rules will be easier to enforce without the need for time-consuming and costly coercive action 
by the government, though coercive measures would still be available as a last resort.  See 
Errol Meidinger, Competitive Supra-Governmental Regulation: How Can It Be Democratic?, 
at 3 (July 26, 2007) (unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Law and 
Society Association, Berlin, Germany) (on file with the author) (“One of the most striking 
developments in supra-governmental regulation has been the broad and continuous expansion 
of participation and transparency, although both remain subject to improvement. 
 
Most 
programs now provide for multi-stakeholder participation, notice and comment processes for 
rulemakings and adjudications, public responses to comments and explanations of decisions, 
formalized dispute resolution and appeals processes, publication of rules, procedures and 
decisions, and so on.”). 
7See infra note 21. 
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succeeds, examining how authoritarian regimes and cults use motivational law to 
consolidate and preserve their power.   
In Part V, I offer a theory of the efficacy of motivational law.  Motivational law 
improves compliance with regulatory law only if (1) either the motivational law 
itself is enforced by sanctions and threat of sanctions sufficiently severe to have a 
deterrent impact or the motivational law is consistent with the self-interest of those 
being regulated, and (2) the linkage between the motivational law and regulatory law 
is evident to those persons who are supposed to comply with the motivational law.  
However, lawmakers are drawn to use motivational law by appearance instead of 
reality, hence many motivational laws are enacted that work poorly in achieving 
compliance.  Instead, they tend to exert a conservative influence on social and legal 
change.   
II. THE CONCEPT OF MOTIVATIONAL LAW 
A.  Defining Motivational Law 
Motivational law consists of those rules and principles,8 a purpose or function of 
which is to motivate people to comply with rules and principles that regulate their 
conduct toward each other or their environment.  I will refer to the latter as 
“regulatory” laws.  A law is not motivational merely because citizens are enthused 
about complying with it.  To fit this definition of motivational law, the law must at 
least be capable, or regarded as capable, of motivating compliance with a regulatory 
law.  A regulatory law may be another law or rule that regulates conduct, or it may 
be that a single law possesses both motivational and regulatory functions. 
For example, the common law requires the formality of consideration to form an 
executory contract for multiple reasons, including evidentiary, channeling, and 
“cautionary” functions.9  The rule requiring consideration is a regulatory law in its 
evidentiary function, but a motivational law to the extent it performs a cautionary 
function.  If the formality of consideration motivates the parties to be serious about 
what they are doing, presumably they will make only those contractual promises that 
they are motivated and able to keep.10  Why we should want parties to be motivated 
to keep their promises and to avoid making promises if they are not serious is a 
matter of efficiency, social policy and, in the view of some, morality, but what is 
important here is that the consideration requirement exists in part because of the 
assumption—accurate or not11—that it helps to ensure that people will be motivated 
to comply with their duties under contract law.   
Motivational law in governance is on the rise.  New Governance relies on 
                                                                
8See Part II.C, infra, for discussion of whether motivational law is “law.”   
9Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 801 (1941). 
10Id. at 800, 805, 815. 
11See, e.g., Mark B. Wessman, Retraining the Gatekeeper: Further Reflections on the 
Doctrine of Consideration, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 713, 828 (1995) (questioning whether the 
consideration requirement actually accomplishes its cautionary function); Mark B. Wessman, 
Should We Fire the Gatekeeper?  An Examination of the Doctrine of Consideration, 48 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 45 (1993); James D. Gordon III, Consideration and the Commercial-Gift 
Dichotomy, 44 VAND. L. REV. 283 (1991); James D. Gordon III, A Dialogue About the 
Doctrine of Consideration, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 987, 993 (1990). 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss1/6
2008] MOTIVATIONAL LAW 115 
increasing motivation to comply as a substitute for traditional command-and-control 
structures.12  New Governance and legal pluralist13 theorists reject the classic 
Austinian definition of law as a command accompanied by threat of a sanction for 
non-compliance,14 and advocate regulation that is cooperative, decentralized or 
“orchestrated” among levels of authority, flexible, participatory, and dynamic, and 
functions through the identification and pursuit of mutual interests.15   In simpler 
terms, governments can achieve higher levels of compliance with regulatory law 
through an approach to regulation that is personalized, consistent with social norms 
about how people should approach others, does not demean or shame those whose 
interests are involved, and gives the stakeholders a sense that they have both a say in 
what is to be required and a stake in complying with those requirements.  Soft law 
exists to increase compliance with regulatory law, and it does so largely by 
increasing motivation to comply.  Soft law is a form of motivational law. 
B.  Uses of Motivational Law: Some Examples 
1.  Obscenity Laws 
Modern obscenity laws originated as motivational laws in 17th century England 
introduced by the Puritan ecclesiastical courts to induce citizens to comply with 
religious prohibitions of immodest behavior.  Immodest behavior was prohibited lest 
it motivate people to violate religious laws banning extramarital sex.16     
The motivational nature of obscenity law persisted in the United States.  Anthony 
Comstock, founder of the Committee for the Suppression of Vice, whose efforts 
resulted in the restrictive Comstock Act of 1873, was a strict Congregationalist who 
                                                                
12Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: the Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004); Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New 
Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous 
Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471 (2004); Orly Lobel, Surreply: Setting the Agenda for New 
Governance Research, 89 MINN. L. REV. 489 (2004); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as 
Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New 
Paradigm?  89 GEO. L.J. 257 (2001); Joel Handler et al., A Roundtable on New Legal Realism, 
Microanalysis of Institutions, and the New Governance: Exploring Convergences and 
Differences, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 479 (2005). 
13Legal pluralism embraces non-governmental regulatory orderings as part of “law,” and 
the rules of non-governmental organizations that contribute to New Governance include many 
with a motivational purpose or function.  See Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 869 (1988); Christine Parker, The Pluralization of Business Regulation, at 5 (July 
25, 2007) (unpublished paper given at the Law & Society Association Annual Meeting, Berlin, 
Germany) (on file with author); Julia Black, Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role 
of Regulation and Self-Regulation in a “Post-Regulatory” World, 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 
103 (2001); Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism, 27 J. LAW & 
SOC’Y. 296 (2000)... 
14See infra p.,74. 
15Lobel, supra note 12, at 348. 
16Mark Conrad, Censorship in America, 10 HUM. RTS. 28, 30 (1982).  Censorship 
previously had been limited to cases of blasphemy and heresy.  Id at, 28-30.   
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perceived himself as working to enforce God’s law.17  The most powerful pressure 
group for film censorship in the United States from the early 1930’s through the 
1960’s was the Legion for Decency, a Catholic organization, which established its 
own film rating board and pressured the motion picture industry in Hollywood to 
enforce its Motion Picture Production Code.18  A “C” rating from the Legion for 
Decency “direct[ed] the nation’s 45 million Catholics to avoid the film as they would 
avoid any other occasion for sin.’”19 
More recently, prominent feminists such as Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea 
Dworkin have supported anti-pornography laws as motivational law on the 
assumption that such laws would reduce the motivation for men to violate laws 
against the rape and abuse of women.20  However, social scientists draw conflicting 
conclusions from the results of existing studies as to whether exposure to 
pornography increases aggressive behavior toward women.21 
2. Military Disciplinary Rules 
Military disciplinary rules are one of the oldest forms of motivational law.  
Soldiers of the Roman Legions were forbidden from marrying, in order to “restore 
                                                                
17Id. at 31. 
18Robert J. Klein, Film Censorship: the American and British Experience, 12 VILL. L. 
REV. 419, 424-427 (1967).   
19Id. at 426, quoting Stone, The Legion of Decency: What’s Nude? 5 RAMPARTS 48 (1965). 
20An anti-pornography ordinance written by Dworkin and MacKinnon briefly became law 
in Indianapolis.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE 
L.J. 589 n.2  (1986).  Cf. Paul Chevigny, Pornography and Cognition: a Reply to Cass 
Sunstein, 1989 DUKE L.J. 420, 432 (1989); ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN 
POSSESSING WOMEN (Perigee Books 3rd ed., 1981); Andrea Dworkin, Pornography Happens 
to Women (1993), available at http://www.nostatusquo.com/ACLU/dworkin/PornHappens. 
html (address given at the University of Chicago Law School); Catherine MacKinnon, 
Pornography as Trafficking, 26 MICH. J. INT. L. 993 (2005). Catherine MacKinnon, 
Pornography Left and Right, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 143 (1995). 
21“Despite the accumulation of an exceedingly large body of literature on the effects of 
exposure to sexually explicit materials [cites omitted] and despite the efforts of no fewer than 
five commissions of inquiry on this subject appointed by the US [cites omitted] and Canadian 
[cites omitted] governments, conclusions concerning effects of exposure to sexually explicit 
materials remain elusive.”  Azy Barak & William A. Fisher, Effects of Interactive Computer 
Erotica on Men’s Attitudes and Behavior Toward Women: an Experimental Study, 13 
COMPUTERS IN HUM. BEHAV. 353, 354 (1997) (finding “use of computer pornography did not 
affect . . . attitudes or behavior toward women”); William A. Fisher & Guy Grenier, Violent 
Pornography, Anti-Woman Thoughts, and Anti-Woman Acts: In Search of Reliable Effects, 31 
J. SEX RES. 23 (1994) (no reliable effects demonstrated). A meta-analysis of several studies in 
2000 concluded that pornography may increase aggression toward women among men who 
already are aggressive, while having divergent effects on non-aggressive men.  Neil M. 
Malamuth, Tamara Addison & Mary Koss, Pornography and Sexual Aggression: Are There 
Reliable Effects and Can We Understand Them? 11 ANN. REV. SEX RES. 26 (2000).  
Malamuth, lead author of the meta-analysis, previously had published his own conclusion that 
pornography’s effect on aggression had been reliably demonstrated, and his own work was 
included in his meta-analysis.     
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old’ discipline.”22  Soldiers are required to salute a superior officer, not to be 
insubordinate, to wear a uniform on duty, to make their beds, and to comply with a 
host of other disciplinary rules.  
By complying with these disciplinary rules before they go into combat, soldiers 
are supposed to become motivated to obey the orders given by their commanding 
officer and the rules of engagement established when they are in battle, 23 as required 
by military law.24  They also are supposed to acquire the motivation to refrain from 
acts, such as torture of prisoners and unnecessary violence against non-combatants, 
that would violate the law of war,25 and to refrain from acts of disloyalty or fear that 
would violate laws against treason,26 desertion,27 and, in the American military, 
numerous other provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.28 
Events in the Middle East illustrate the importance of law as both a source of 
intrinsic control even within a command and control structure, and a source of 
instability.  At Abu Ghraib, soldiers, indoctrinated to obey their superiors, tortured 
prisoners in accordance with what they thought were the rules of engagement: do 
anything you have to do to get prisoners to talk.29  Similarly, Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed beheaded Daniel Pearl (or so he claimed), and was proud of it, because a 
regimen of indoctrination30 prescribed by the motivational law of the Muslim 
                                                                
22SARA ELISE PHANG, THE MARRIAGE OF ROMAN SOLDIERS (13 B.C.-A.D. 235): LAW AND 
FAMILY IN THE IMPERIAL ARMY 325 (E.J. Brill, 2001). 
23MARK J. OSIEL, OBEYING ORDERS: ATROCITY, MILITARY DISCIPLINE & THE LAW OF WAR 
16 (1999). (discussing Aristotle’s view that restraint in combat depends on soldiers’ being of 
suitable temperament and disposition, and that “the dedicated exercise of a vocation cultivates 
within its conscientious practitioners . . . the virtues peculiar to it,” which the author calls a 
process of “habituation”).   
24For relevant offenses under American military law, see Arts. 88-92, Uniform Code of 
Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 888-892 [hereinafter  U.C.M.J.]. 
25The law of war generally is found in four documents: the Hague Conventions, Feb. 2, 
1910, 36 Stat. 2259, 2277, and 2314; the Geneva Conventions, Feb. 2, 1956, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 
3217, 3316, and 3516 and their 1977 Protocols, and the Conventional Weapons Treaty of 
1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137.  MICHAEL W. REISMAN & CHRIS T. ANTONIOU, THE LAWS OF WAR: 
A COMPREHENSIVE COLLECTION OF PRIMARY DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL LAWS 
GOVERNING ARMED CONFLICT (Vintage Books, 1st ed, 1994)  These documents establish four 
basic principles: military necessity, distinction, proportionality, and humanity.  A. P.V. 
ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 1-26 (Juris Publishing 2nd ed., 1996).  Cf. Manuel E.F. 
Supervielle, Islam, the Law of War, and the U.S. Soldier, 21 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 191 (2005) 
(arguing for mandatory education on the Islamic view of the law of war for U.S. soldiers sent 
to Iraq). 
2618 U.S.C. § 2381. 
27Art. 85, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 885; United States v. Gonzalez, 42 M.J. 469 (C.A.A.F. 
1995). 
28See Arts. 86 through 106a and 133, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. §§ 886-906a and 933. 
29On a different version of the facts, if the soldiers knew or had reason to know that torture 
was prohibited by the rules of engagement, one could construe Abu Ghraib as a failure of 
motivational law.  I do not mean to take sides regarding the specific facts of that incident. 
30On its official website, http://www.ummah.net/ikhwan/ the Muslim Brotherhood states 
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Brotherhood, of which he was a member from the time he was 16,31 succeeded in 
motivating him to commit atrocities in compliance with that organization’s version 
of Islamic law (shari’a) on the conduct of a holy war (jihad). 
3. Religious Laws 
Motivational law has ancient roots in law-based32 religions such as Islam and 
traditional Judaism, in which rules on liturgy and ritual and rules mandating religious 
dress, diet and holiday observance—rules with a motivational purpose33—not only 
have kept religious communities intact, but have endowed their religious legal 
systems with great longevity and effectiveness.  An Orthodox Jewish man’s wearing 
ritual fringes on his clothing may be a cultural norm, but it is a norm with a 
motivational purpose34 thrust upon Orthodox Jews by a 3,400-year-old Biblical 
injunction they regard as law.35  Islam, too, is full of rules that mandate motivational 
practices to ward off the ever-present temptation to violate religious law.36   
                                                           
that its members are indoctrinated to become “organized and self-struggling” through a 
regimen of “Islamic education (tarbieh),” which includes “Halaqa (a weekly unit study and 
practice meeting)”; “Katibah (a monthly several-units-meeting)”; a “trip”; “camp”; “course”; 
“workshop”; and “conference.” (last visited Nov. 15, 2007). 
31See Christina Lamb, Focus: The Confessions of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, SUNDAY 
TIMES, Nov 15, 2007, at 15, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article 
10526 62.ece?token=null&offset=0. 
32Law-based religions identify the objective of one’s life with compliance with a code of 
rules, established under divine authority.  Traditional Judaism and Islam both have codes of 
law, even covering tort and contract law.  In contrast, in faith- or mind-state-based religions, 
the objective of one’s life is to gain immortality by achieving a certain state of consciousness.  
In the Protestant denominations of Christianity the state of consciousness is complete faith in 
Jesus as the savior from sin, and in Buddhism it is satori leading to nirvana.  See infra notes 
37-38. 
33Regarding the motivational purpose of Jewish liturgy, see ARNOLD S. ROSENBERG, 
JEWISH LITURGY AS A SPIRITUAL SYSTEM 4 (1997). 
34Numbers 15:38-39 (Schocken): 
Speak to the Children of Israel and say to them that they are to make themselves 
tassels on the corners of their garments…that you may look at it and keep-in-mind all 
the commandments of YHWH and observe them, that you not go scouting-around 
after your heart, after your eyes which you go whoring after . . . . 
Biblical translations in this article are from The Schocken Bible: Volume I: The Five Books of 
Moses (Everett Fox trans., 1995). 
35Historically, the practice of wearing knotted ritual fringes may have been derived from 
ancient Persian religion.  Some Zoroastrians today continue to wear knotted cords, called 
kusti, as a reminder of their religious obligations.  MARY BOYCE, ZOROASTRIANS: THEIR 
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND PRACTICES 31 (1979). 
36For instance, some ascribe to the requirement of salat, the five-times-daily prayer 
mandated by Islamic law, a rationale that resembles that of the knotted ritual fringes in 
Judaism and Zoroastrianism: 
The constant guarding against disobedience [of Islamic law] and sins wakes you up for 
the morning prayer.  Salat is not just what you say with your mouth and do with your 
limbs.  It is a state of your heart.  So when you do things in a day for God and avoid 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss1/6
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Christianity is predominantly, though not exclusively, a faith-based religion.  
Roman Catholicism considers Old Testament motivational laws on religious dress 
and ritual to be non-binding,37 and the Protestant denominations since Martin Luther 
have considered that one can be saved through faith in Jesus alone rather than 
through good works, though faith motivates people to perform good works.38  
                                                           
other things because of Him, it means you’re thinking about Him, and therefore it 
becomes easy for you to strive for Him against yourself and your desires.  
Saba Mahmood, Rehearsed Spontaneity and the Conventionality of Ritual: Disciplines of 
Salat, 28 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 827, 831 (2001), quoting “Mona,” a member of the Women’s 
Mosque movement in Cairo.  
37The Catholic Church follows Thomas Aquinas, who classified the Old Testament laws 
on religious dress and ritual purity as “ceremonial” and therefore not binding, having been 
superseded by the new covenant (“New Law”) of Jesus.  See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA 
THEOLOGICA (PRIMA SECUNDAE PARTIS) Question 101 (2d ed. 1920) (online ed., Kevin Knight 
trans., 2006), available at http://www.newadvent. org/summa/2101.htm:  
[T]he ceremonial precepts are those which refer to the worship of God.  Now the 
Divine worship is twofold: internal, and external. For since man is composed of soul 
and body, each of these should be applied to the worship of God; the soul by an 
interior worship; the body by an outward worship: hence it is written (Psalms 83:3): 
“My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God.”  And as the body is ordained 
to God through the soul, so the outward worship is ordained to the internal worship.  
Now interior worship consists in the soul being united to God by the intellect and 
affections.  Wherefore according to the various ways in which the intellect and 
affections of the man who worships God are rightly united to God, his external 
actions are applied in various ways to the Divine worship.  For in the state of future 
bliss, the human intellect will gaze on the Divine Truth in Itself.  Wherefore the 
external worship will not consist in anything figurative, but solely in the praise of 
God, proceeding from the inward knowledge and affection, according to Is. 51:3: 
“Joy and gladness shall be found therein, thanksgiving and the voice of praise.”  But in 
the present state of life, we are unable to gaze on the Divine Truth in Itself, and we 
need the ray of Divine light to shine upon us under the form of certain sensible figures, 
as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. i); in various ways, however, according to the 
various states of human knowledge.  For under the Old Law, neither was the Divine 
Truth manifest in Itself, nor was the way leading to that manifestation as yet opened 
out, as the Apostle declares (Hebrews 9:8).  Hence the external worship of the Old 
Law needed to be figurative not only of the future truth to be manifested in our 
heavenly country, but also of Christ, Who is the way leading to that heavenly 
manifestation.  
But under the New Law this way is already revealed: and therefore it needs no longer 
to be foreshadowed as something future, but to be brought to our minds as something 
past or present: and the truth of the glory to come, which is not yet revealed, alone 
needs to be foreshadowed.  This is what the Apostle says (Hebrews 11:1): “The 
Law has [Vulg.: 'having'] a shadow of the good things to come, not the very image of 
the things”: for a shadow is less than an image; so that the image belongs to the New 
Law, but the shadow to the Old. 
38Martin Luther wrote: 
Faith is a living, bold trust in God's grace, so certain of God's favor that it would risk 
death a thousand times trusting in it.  Such confidence and knowledge of God's grace 
makes you happy, joyful and bold in your relationship to God and all creatures. The 
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Islamic societies in which motivational law is deeply ingrained clash with 
predominantly Christian democracies that do not use it as much and understand it 
even less.   
Ancient religious rulemakers assumed that mandating rituals, liturgy or religious 
dress would increase compliance with other religious laws and bind the religious 
community together.39  The Bush Administration’s policy of funding “faith-based” 
social service organizations is rooted in a similar assumption, fed by studies funded 
and conducted by Christian conservative organizations,40 that increased religious 
faith could increase compliance with law.  However, the objective of law-based 
religions such as Judaism and Islam is not that the adherent should have faith or be 
saved through faith but that the adherent should comply with regulatory religious 
laws that govern his or her conduct vis-à-vis other people, nature and the divine. 
                                                           
Holy Spirit makes this happen through faith. Because of it, you freely, willingly and 
joyfully do good to everyone, serve everyone, suffer all kinds of things, love and 
praise the God who has shown you such grace. Thus, it is just as impossible to 
separate faith and works as it is to separate heat and light from fire!  
63 DR. MARTIN LUTHER’S VERMISCHTE DEUTSCHE SCHRIFTEN 124-125 (Johann K. Irmischer 
ed., Robert E. Smith trans., 1854), available at http://www.iclnet.org/pub/resources/text/ 
wittenberg/luther/luther-faith.txt.  
39For example, following the destruction of the Second Temple, Rabban Gamaliel II 
standardized the format of the Amidah (“Standing Prayer”) as a substitute for Temple 
sacrifice, in order to make it more likely that the community would survive to restore 
compliance with divine commandments concerning sacrificial worship that required the return 
of the exiled Jews and rebuilding of the Temple.  THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Berakhot 26b; 
ROSENBERG, supra note 33, at 75-76; ISMAR ELBOGEN, JEWISH LITURGY: A COMPREHENSIVE 
HISTORY 31-32, 201-02 (Raymond Scheindlin trans., 1993).  See also Ezra Fleischer, On the 
Beginnings of Obligatory Jewish Prayer, 59 TARBIZ 397 (1990) (Hebrew); The Shemone Esre: 
Its Character, Internal Order, Content and Goals, 62 TARBIZ 179 (1992) (Hebrew); Reuven 
Kimelman, The Daily Amidah and the Rhetoric of Redemption, 79 JEWISH. Q. REV. 165 
(1989); Leon J. Liebreich, The Intermediate Benedictions of the Amidah, 42 JEWISH. Q. REV. 
423 (1952).  
40For example, So Help Me God: Substance Abuse, Religion and Spirituality was a 2001 
study largely funded by the John Templeton Foundation and conducted by the National Center 
on Addition and Substance Abuse, an organization, chaired by Joseph Califano, with a board 
of directors that included Columba Bush (wife of Gov. Jeb Bush), Kenneth Chenault, a 
prominent donor to conservative causes, and Nancy Reagan.   The title of an article about 
Califano made the point: Thou Shalt Not: Once a Presidential Adviser and Legal 
Heavyweight, Joe Califano Now is Thundering Against Drugs. And Woe Be to Those Who 
Doubt His Data or Get in His Way. WASHINGTONIAN MAG. Oct., 1998, at 71.  Another 
example is Byron R. Johnson, OBJECTIVE HOPE: ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FAITH-
BASED ORGANIZATIONS: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE (2002), http://www.manhattan-
institute.org/html/crrucs-obj_hope.htm, which was dedicated “to the memory of Dr. David B. 
Larson, the pioneering leader of faith factor research.”  When doing “faith factor research,” it 
is not likely that one will find “faith” not to be a factor.  Dr. Johnson was “deluged with 
requests for…research to support . . . assertions by President Bush and other politicians that 
religious programs can transform . . . lives . . . , and that it can do so for less money than 
government programs.”  Laurie Goodstein, Church-Based Projects Lack Data on Results N. 
Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2001, at A12.  Johnson was quoted as saying that “there is little reliable 
research proving the effectiveness of religious programs,” a point that one has to glean from 
reading his cautiously-worded conclusions very carefully.  Both studies were published 
independently rather than in peer-reviewed journals. 
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4.  Censorship Laws 
Authoritarian regimes use censorship laws to motivate citizens to comply with 
their commands.  Most laws requiring censorship of the news have a motivational 
purpose in this sense.41  The statute of Nazi Germany requiring all healthy “Aryan” 
children over the age of nine to join the Hitler Youth42 served the motivational 
purpose of ensuring their indoctrination and obedience, as well as expanding the 
force of free child labor to support the German military and propaganda machines.  
The Ministry of Information of the People’s Republic of China currently censors 
Internet news services according to 2005 regulations, which give the purpose of 
censorship as to ensure news reports are “serving socialism,” “upholding the 
interests of the state,” and “correctly guiding public opinion.”43 
5.  Credit Counseling Requirement for Consumer Bankruptcy 
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 
(“BAPCPA”) imposed new eligibility requirements for consumers who file Chapter 
7 bankruptcy petitions.44  The principal new requirement is the means test contained 
in Bankruptcy Code §707(b), but BAPCPA also requires that the debtor undergo 
credit counseling, both before and after the petition is filed.45  
                                                                
41Of course, not all censorship of news is motivational.  Military press censorship has the 
non-motivational function of withholding strategic information from the enemy.  Cf. Jack A. 
Gottschalk, Consistent with Security: a History of American Military Press Censorship, 5 
COMM. & L. 35 (1983).  The several exceptions in the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 
5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2000), exist for non-motivational purposes, rather than because release of 
the excepted information would endanger the legitimacy of the government.   
[FOIA's] basic policy of “ ‘full agency disclosure unless information is exempted 
under clearly delineated statutory language,’ ” indeed focuses on the citizens' right to 
be informed about “what their government is up to.” Official information that sheds 
light on an agency's performance of its statutory duties falls squarely within that 
statutory purpose.   
U.S. Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Comm. For Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989) 
(citations omitted). 
42Reich Youth Service Law, December 1939.  See ALFONS HECK, A CHILD OF HITLER: 
GERMANY IN THE DAYS WHEN GOD WORE A SWASTIKA 7 (1985). 
43People’s Republic of China Ministry of Information and State Council, Rules on the 
Administration of Internet News Services (September 25, 2005).  See Kristen Farrell, Big 
Mamas are Watching: China’s Censorship of the Internet and the Strain on Freedom of 
Expression, 15 MICH. ST. J. INT’L. L. 577, 589 (2007). 
44Pub. L. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005). 
45With few exceptions, the debtor must have undergone a “briefing” by an approved 
budget and credit counseling agency within 180 days before filing the petition that covered the 
types of credit counseling programs available, and assisted the debtor in preparing a “related 
budget analysis”.  11 U.S.C. § 109(h) (2000).  Approved pre-petition briefings must take at 
least 90 minutes.  BAPCPA §104, codified at 11 U.S.C. § 342(b) (2000), also requires the 
clerk of the Bankruptcy Court to give notice to debtors of the “alternative” of credit 
counseling.  After filing the petition, the debtor must complete “an instructional course 
concerning personal financial management” as a condition for discharge.  11 U.S.C. § 
727(a)(11) (2000).   See Karen Gross and Susan Block-Lieb, Empty Mandate or Opportunity 
for Innovation?  Pre-Petition Credit Counseling and Post-Petition Financial Management 
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These eligibility requirements generally were intended to motivate consumer 
debtors to comply with their obligations under contract law to the extent possible 
rather than discharge them in bankruptcy: 
[B]ankruptcy should not merely be a means of violating promises willy-
nilly.  A promise to repay money is an important legal and moral 
obligation, neither lightly to be undertaken nor lightly cast away.  Filing 
bankruptcy represents a decision to repudiate promises made in exchange 
for goods, services, and other promises.  Of such promises and reciprocity 
is the fabric of civil society woven.46 
Chapter 7 debtors with incomes above the state median now risk dismissal of 
their petitions for “abuse” under §707(b) unless they show their disposable income, 
calculated according to a formula based on living expense standards developed for 
tax collection purposes, would be insufficient to pay at least $100 per month on their 
general unsecured debts, or if able to pay between $100 and $166, that over five 
years they still could not pay at least 25% of those debts.  Debtors who flunk the 
means test must spend five years paying all of their disposable income to creditors 
under Chapter 13, or forego bankruptcy altogether. 
The same motivational concept underlies credit counseling.  The pre-bankruptcy 
“briefing” requirement can make bankruptcy impracticable where time is of the 
essence.47  Post-bankruptcy financial management counseling is supposed to 
motivate the debtor to manage her finances so as to avoid future breaches of 
contract.48 
6.  Prohibition of Abortion Counseling 
The Missouri statute upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services,49 prohibiting abortion counseling for pregnant 
women, was intended to prevent the encouragement of abortion.  Proponents of the 
legislation believed that women have a legal obligation to protect their unborn 
children which would be violated by an abortion, and that counseling by abortion 
advocates would motivate them to violate that obligation.  Put another way, the 
purpose of the Missouri statute was to prevent interference with motivation on the 
part of pregnant women to comply with a perceived obligation to protect the fetus. 
                                                           
Education, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 549 (2005). 
46Edith H. Jones and Todd J. Zywicki, It’s Time for Means-Testing, 1999 BYU L. REV. 
177, 181 (1999). 
47See, e.g., In re Gee, 332 B.R. 602 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005) (dismissing petition where 
debtor failed to satisfy the pre-bankruptcy “briefing” requirement of § 109(h), though a 
foreclosure sale of her home was scheduled for the same day that she filed her petition). 
48Gross and Block-Lieb, supra note 45, at 549 (stating that the purpose of credit 
counseling requirement in BAPCPA was to give debtors “the financial knowledge or insights 
to make better choices in the consumer financial markets after their cases were closed”). 
49Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).  
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7.  Rehabilitation in the Criminal Justice System 
Laws aimed at rehabilitating offenders have an obvious motivational function.  
Rehabilitation recently has seen a resurgence as an objective in criminal justice, 
particularly in the juvenile justice system,50 with the establishment of specialized 
courts that have a rehabilitative focus, attempting to motivate juveniles with drug 
problems, for example, to refrain from further violations of anti-drug laws and laws 
prohibiting crimes they committed, such as robbery and burglary, to feed their drug 
habit.51  Some states have gone so far as to enact statutes establishing what they call 
“motivational boot camps” for offenders.52   
Motivational law also has crept into sentencing in recent years as trial judges 
have devised creative approaches that incorporate motivational techniques in order to 
prevent recidivism.  One such technique is formal shaming, by such measures as 
requiring defendants convicted of drunk driving to place signs on their cars 
identifying them as convicted drunk drivers.53  Where formal shaming is imposed 
with the intent to change the mind of the defendant and instill motivation to comply 
with the law, it is a form of motivational law.  For instance, convicted felons may be 
forced to have ongoing interaction with their victims or others harmed by their 
conduct in the hope that they will be sensitized to the consequences of their crimes 
and avoid them in the future.  Such sentencing practices may be justified as 
rehabilitative,54 but whether formal shaming works will depend largely on whether 
the individual is a member of a group whose opinion of his behavior matters to him, 
whether that group’s conduct toward the individual is altered by knowledge of his 
crime, and whether the individual has a means of redeeming himself in the eyes of 
the group through compliance with the law.55 
8. Motivational Rules in the Common Law 
As discussed above, the requirement of consideration to form a contract 
possesses a motivational function.56  It is not alone; other common law rules also 
serve motivational purposes.  For example, the rule of evidence law making evidence 
of subsequent remedial measures inadmissible in tort cases to prove negligence or 
culpability originated in the English chancery courts to avoid “hold[ing] out an 
inducement for continued negligence,”57 i.e., to avoid motivating past tortfeasors to 
                                                                
50Daniel M. Filler & Austin E. Smith, The New Rehabilitation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 951 
(2006). 
51Id. at 954.  
52See, e.g., 61 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1121 (Supp. 1998); Pa. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 
U.S. 206 (1998). 
53Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880 
(1990).  
54Id. at 1894-1895. 
55Id. at 1888.  
56See supra note 9, at 1.  
57Columbia & P.S.R. R.R. Co. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202 (1892) (citing Hart v. Ry. 
Co.,16 N.W. 358, 359 (1883)); 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON 
LAW §283, 175 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 1979).  See also FED. R. EVID. 407. 
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breach their duty to exercise due care in the future.  Like consideration, livery of 
seisin in property law, the required formalities to make a will, and the use of a seal as 
a substitute for consideration all performed motivational functions in addition to their 
evidentiary functions, attempting to drive home to the parties the seriousness of what 
they were doing in order to ensure they were motivated to comply with the legal 
duties they were undertaking, or in the case of a will, to encourage them to ensure 
that their named executor and beneficiaries were motivated to comply with the duties 
they were imposing and to accept the allocation of rights among them under the will.   
9.  Monarchical Privileges 
Absolute monarchies have relied on motivational law since antiquity.  In ancient 
Persia, the visitor had to prostrate himself for, kneel in front of, bow for or blow a 
kiss to the king.  The Greeks originally observed such rules only for gods, but 
beginning in the 4th century B.C. various Greek rulers, including the rulers of 
Syracuse, then the largest and most powerful of the city-states, and later Alexander 
the Great himself, declared themselves gods and imposed similar requirements to 
motivate their subjects to obey the laws they dictated.58 
Laws regarding the privileges and pomp of modern constitutional monarchies are 
a vestige of these ancient practices intended to motivate compliance with the ruler’s 
commands.  The institution of royalty in a constitutional or parliamentary 
monarchical system today performs primarily a motivational function.59  Laws that 
command public respect for the position of the Queen of England are supposed to 
fortify the inclination of her subjects to comply with the laws enacted by her 
government.60   
10.  Procedural Due Process 
In a broad sense, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution is an example of motivational law.  Authorities generally are 
regarded as having the right to dictate behavior if their claim of this right derives 
from a process regarded as fair, and if their past efforts at dictating behavior had 
outcomes regarded as fair.  For example, citizens more willingly accept the outcomes 
                                                                
58See Jona Lendering, Alexander the God, http://www.livius.org/aj-al/alexander/ 
alexander_z3.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2007).  See also Praise Poem of Shulgi, http://earth-
history.com/Sumer/sumer-poem-shulgi.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2007) (ancient Sumer, over 
4,500 years ago). 
59One commentator on a BBC News program regarding whether to abolish the monarchy 
made the following connection between motivation and the institution of the monarchy:   
Republics are very sterile, where you don't look to the head of state with any kind of 
affection. If you saw the candidates at the last Irish presidential election you would 
understand, there was no passion and even a little apathy about the choice. The 
monarchy is instantly recognisable across the world and a great reflection of historical 
stability. 
Talking Point:  What’s the Enduring Appeal of the Royal Family? (BBC Television Broadcast 
Aug. 9, 2000) available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/talking_point/843408.stm.  
60For example, new citizens in the U.K. must take an oath of allegiance to the Queen.   
Nationality, Immigration & Asylum Act, 2002, c. 41, § 3, sched. 1 (Eng.).  Practicing any 
harm to, or slandering, the King, Queen or heirs apparent is considered high treason and is 
punishable by life imprisonment.  Crime & Disorder Act, 1998, c. 37, § 36 (Eng.). 
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of litigation and comply with court orders if the court that issues those orders has a 
track record of issuing orders regarded as just and follows procedures generally 
regarded as consistent with norms of fairness.61  The same rules of procedure that 
make the judicial system fair, or at least give it the appearance of fairness, also 
motivate citizens to comply with the orders and judgments that are the system’s 
output. 
C. Motivational Law in Legal Theory 
H.L.A. Hart famously distinguished between primary “duty-imposing” rules and 
secondary “power-conferring” rules, and located the “central elements” of law in the 
interplay between these two kinds of rules.62  Hart’s theory of law performs poorly, 
however, in identifying the central elements of motivational law. 
Many motivational laws are primary rules by Hart’s definition because they 
require human beings “to do or abstain from certain actions, whether they wish to or 
not,”63 yet compelling the actions they enjoin people to do or abstain from doing is 
secondary to their overall purpose.  Wearing tzitzit, ritual fringes, for example, is a 
primary rule in Jewish law; a Jewish man is obligated to wear them whether he 
wishes to or not.  Yet, the principal objective of the rule on wearing tzitzit is to 
motivate people to perform divine commandments, or mitzvot.  A Jewish man who 
wears tzitzit but performs no other commandments has fulfilled the letter of the 
primary rule but frustrated its purpose. 
Moreover, many of the 613 divine commandments in the Torah (Five Books of 
Moses) would be neither primary nor secondary rules according to Hart, since they 
neither impose a duty nor give powers to people.64  Rather, they are mere 
exhortations to do things that one is, in Hart’s terminology, “obliged” rather than 
“obligated” to perform.  For example, Deuteronomy provides that if one goes to war, 
one should not fear his enemies,65 and it commands people to “love God”66 and 
imitate God’s good and upright ways.67  Fear is natural in war, the commandment is 
just an exhortation to try to overcome it, and one can never say she has loved God or 
imitated God’s ways sufficiently to have satisfied the commandment to do so.  Under 
Hart’s analysis these “commandments” are not even rules, yet the commandment to 
wear tzitzit to remind oneself to perform those non-rules is a primary rule. 
Other motivational laws would be secondary rules in Hart’s analysis.  The 
common law does not compel a party to enter into a contract, it just empowers it to 
do so by, inter alia, complying with the formality of consideration.  But the purpose 
of the formality, apart from its evidentiary and channeling functions, is to motivate 
contracting parties to be serious about promises, and by virtue of that seriousness, to 
                                                                
61TYLER, supra note 3. 
62H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 81, 240 (1997). 
63Id. at 81. 
64HART, supra note 62, at 81.   For a complete list of the 613 commandments organized by 
subject-matter, see http://www.jewfaq.org/613.htm.  
65Deuteronomy 3:22, 7:21, 20:3, 20:4 (Schocken). 
66Deuteronomy 6:5 (Schocken). 
67Deuteronomy 28:9 (Schocken). 
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comply with the obligations they assume under contract law.  Secondary rules can 
perform a motivational function just as primary rules can, but this identity of 
function is lost in Hart’s dichotomy of laws.   
According to Lon Fuller’s functionalist conception of law68 and the more recent 
legal pluralist theories, motivational laws would qualify as laws.  In Fuller’s theory, 
laws must satisfy seven conditions: they must be expressed in general yet 
understandable terms; publicly promulgated; prospective in effect; consistent with 
one another; not require conduct beyond the powers of the affected parties; not be 
changed so frequently that the subject cannot rely on them; and administered 
consistently with their wording.69  Motivational laws are generally capable of 
satisfying these conditions but are no different from regulatory laws in these 
respects.  As in Hart’s case, the lack of a distinction in Fuller’s theory obscures the 
distinction between motivational law and regulatory law in practice. 
Motivational laws are particularly common among religions and in industry self-
regulation.  Lacking coercive power, most religious institutions and trade 
organizations must find alternative sources of motivation to achieve compliance with 
their rules.  Are religious laws, industry codes, and other non-governmental rules that 
perform a motivational function “laws” even though they are not enacted by the 
sovereign authority?  Hart would deny that a rule can be “law” when it is not 
promulgated by a sovereign whose orders are habitually obeyed.70  Weber and 
Durkheim would characterize them as norms.  Yet, functionally they may be any of 
the above, or all of them. 
Non-governmental rules such as industry codes and religious laws easily qualify 
as “law” in legal pluralist theory, in which the quest for “law” is a largely semantic 
endeavor.   
An “extended” view of legal pluralism points out that . . . in contemporary 
societies there are a range . . . rule systems, normative orderings and 
symbolic meaning systems that should, or could, also be described as 
“law”. Families, corporations, ethnic and religious groups, friendship 
groups and many other ‘semi-autonomous social fields’ can all ‘generate 
rules and customs and symbols internally’ that influence people’s 
behaviour and consciousness as much, or more, than does the official 
law.71 
In the view of legal positivists, motivation for compliance makes no difference in 
determining whether a rule or principle is “law”.  Consider hijab, Islamic law 
requiring modesty in dress.  Hijab is normative in many parts of the Islamic world, 
but it also is a set of rules based on interpretations of passages of the Qu’ran72 and 
                                                                
68See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 46-91 (2d ed. 1969). 
69Id. at 46-91. 
70HART, supra note 62, at 44-49; id. at 50 (devoting considerable attention to what is 
meant by “habit” and “obedience”).    
71Parker, supra note 13, at 3-4 (citing D.J. GALLIGAN, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 173-192 
(Clarendon Law Series, 2007)); See also Tamanaha, supra note 13, at 298; Black, supra note 
13, at 134-35; Merry, supra note 13, at 886-88. 
72Qu’ran 33:59 (“believing women” told to “cast their outer garments over their persons . . 
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the Hadith,73 backed by a threat of divine punishment for non-compliance.  By 
Austin’s classic definition of “law” as a command backed by a threat of a sanction,74 
Islamic rules regarding hijab are law, whether or not the woman to whom the 
command is directed believes in the divine sanctions that are the only possible 
formal punishment.  Legal pluralism, too, renders motivation irrelevant; just about 
any rule, principle, norm or custom is “law.” 
D. Motivational Law’s Boundaries 
A command coupled with a threat of sanctions is motivational in that the purpose 
of the threat is to instill motivation to comply.  However, by my definition,75 “murder 
is a felony punishable by life in prison” is a regulatory rather than motivational law 
because its purpose or function is to regulate human behavior by making murder 
illegal, not to motivate compliance with another law. 
Psychologists disagree on how to define “motivation.”76  One concise and 
comprehensible definition is the “drives, urges, wishes, or desires which initiate . . . 
                                                           
. that they should be known (as such) and not molested”); Qu’ran 33:32 (wives of the Prophet 
told “if you fear God, do not be too complacent in your speech, lest the lecherous-hearted 
should lust after you. Talk with such people in plain and simple words. Abide still in your 
homes and do not display your finery as women used to do in the days of ignorance. Attend to 
your prayers, give alms and obey God and His Messenger. O woman of this house, the 
Almighty wants to cleanse you from the filth [these hypocrites want to besmear you with] and 
to fully purify you”); Surah an-Nurayah 31 (enjoining women to dress modestly except in the 
presence of close relatives, small children “to whom the nakedness of women is not apparent,” 
and “followers from the men who do not feel sexual desire”) 
73The authoritative Hadith of Sahih Bukhari provides the most widely accepted source for 
hijab.  It says, “My Lord agreed with me ('Umar) in three things . . . (2) And as regards the 
veiling of women, I said 'O Allah's Apostle!  I wish you ordered your wives to cover 
themselves from the men because good and bad ones talk to them.' So the verse of the veiling 
of the women was revealed.”  BUKHARI, Vol. 1, Book 8, Sunnah 395.  SUNAN ABU DAWUD, 
Vol. 3, Book XXVII, Ch. 1535, Hadith No. 4092 is also cited: “A’isha said: Asma’, daughter 
of Abu Bakr, entered upon the Apostle of Allah (May peace be upon him) wearing thin 
clothes. The Apostle of Allah (peace be upon him) turned his attention from her. He said: O 
Asma’, when a woman reaches the age of menstruation, it does not suit her that she displays 
her parts of body except this and this, and he pointed to her face and hands.”  
74JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 14-15 (David Campbell & 
Philip Thomas eds., 1998).  Austin, writing in the early 1830s, and following Bentham, was 
attempting to give a definition of law that was not loaded with moral judgments, law as it is 
rather than law as it should be.  A law, which actually exists, is a law, though we happen to 
dislike it.  Id. at 184-85.  Natural law philosophers, in contrast, postulated the existence of a 
divine law, sometimes consistent with earthly legislation and sometimes not. In this context, 
Austin’s definition actually broadened the notion of law from those earthly enactments that 
were consistent with divine law or morals, to include those that were not. He was careful to 
add that the promise of a reward is not a “sanction,” therefore legislation that promised a 
reward for obeying a command, but lacked a threat of punishment for violating it, was not a 
“law.” Id.  
75See Part II.A of the text. 
76A 1981 study catalogued a total of 102 different definitions of “motivation” used in 
psychology. Paul R. Kleinginna & Anne M. Kleinginna, A Categorized List of Motivation 
Definitions, With a Suggestion for a Consensual Definition, 5 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 263, 
273-87 (1981). See also Richard A. Littman, Motives, History and Causes, in NEBRASKA 
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“behavior”.”77  Laws can instill the drive, urge, wish and desire to comply with other 
laws in three ways other than deterrence: by creating incentives or the perception of 
incentives for compliance with other laws, making it easier or more feasible for 
people to comply with other laws, or mandating or inducing people to act in ways 
that make them more likely to comply with other laws. 
Incentives need not be tangible; they can be religious rewards.78  Another 
instrumental form of motivational law is laws that place in people’s hands the means 
to comply with other laws, such as laws mandating publicity and educational 
campaigns to promote compliance with new statutes or administrative regulations 
and laws appropriating funds to facilitate compliance with previously unfunded legal 
mandates.  Congress takes motivation into account continually when it appropriates 
funds for public education and advertising campaigns to promote compliance with 
statutory obligations.79  The federal government spends over $1 billion annually for 
advertising.80     
Motivational laws may mandate or facilitate actions to heighten the perception of 
legitimacy, or mandate or facilitate actions that heighten the normative influence of a 
reference group or community to comply with laws or rules consistent with, or 
expressive of, the norms of the group or community.81  Motivational laws also can 
                                                           
SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION: 1958 114, 136-37,(Marshall R. Jones ed., 6th vol. 1970) (1958). 
A Google search for a definition of “motivation,” http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&defl= 
en&q=define:MOTIVATION&sa=X&oi=glossary_definition&ct=title, conducted on April 
15, 2007, yielded 30 definitions. Among the best and simplest: “desire to accomplish a goal or 
participate in an endeavor;” “feelings that drive someone toward a particular objective;” and 
“the need or desire that determines an individual’s effort, behaviors and actions.” 
77James A. Bayton, Motivation, Cognition, Learning: Basic Factors in Human Behavior, 
22 J. MKTG. 282, 282 (1958).   
78The Bible says God rewards goodness—performing God’s commandments - “unto the 
thousandth generation.” Exodus 20:6 (Schocken).  And the Qu’ran says “martyrs” (shahadeh) 
“will be with . . . goodly” women who have “obey[ed] Allah and the Apostle.” Qu’ran 4:69.  
Of course, what constitutes “martyrdom” is hotly contested within Islam and is beyond the 
scope of this paper.  
79Typical examples abound. See, e.g., S. 1139, 108th Cong. §2(b) (2003) (mandating a 
compliance campaign focused on reducing alcohol-impaired driving and increasing seat belt 
use); H.R. 4747, 108th Cong. §6 (2004) (proposing ten million dollars for education regarding 
the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994 through “public education forums, 
advertising, and the Internet”). 
80KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS, PUBLIC 
RELATIONS & PROPAGANDA: RESTRICTIONS ON EXECUTIVE AGENCY ACTIVITIES at n.29 (2005), 
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32750.pdf (citing KEVIN R. KOSAR, 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS, GOVERNMENT ADVERTISING 
EXPENDITURES: AN OVERVIEW (2004)). In addition, federal agencies contracted out $88 million 
for public relations services. Id. at 8. Federal funding for publicity is normally supposed to 
promote compliance with law; appropriations laws for roughly the past fifty years have 
included a provision that prohibits expenditure of funds “for propaganda and publicity 
purposes not authorized by Congress.” Id. at 5. 
81See David Engel, Globalization and the Decline of Legal Consciousness: Torts, Ghosts 
and Karma in Thailand, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 469 (2005) (showing a decline in legal 
consciousness corresponding to a sense of powerlessness due, inter alia, to the perception of 
increased corruption in the Thai judicial system). 
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function through legal consciousness, by raising awareness of legal rights and 
obligations.82  While motivational laws promote a consciousness of duties under 
religious law, they do not necessarily lead to increased consciousness of legal rights 
under secular law.  In fact, religious forms of discourse and religious grounds are 
sometimes used by religious adherents to rationalize the conscious decision to refrain 
from exercising legal rights they possess under secular law.83 
Laws that mandate or facilitate acts that heighten the normative influence of a 
reference group or community to comply with laws or rules consistent with, or 
expressive of, the norms of the group or community include laws that promote group 
cohesion and allegiance to the group.  Religious laws promoting a sense of spiritual 
community or religious identity in turn motivate individual members of the group to 
do what they perceive will enhance their reputation within the group.84  Laws on 
national independence celebrations or recital of a national anthem have the purpose 
of heightening the influence of the community on individuals to promote compliance 
with other laws that require citizens to perform civic duties such as military service, 
                                                                
82The term “legal consciousness” is used loosely in scholarship.  Some use the phrase to 
refer to attitudes about law.  See, e.g., Loretta J. Stalans & Karyl A. Kinsey, Self-presentation 
and Legal Socialization in Society: Available Messages About Personal Tax Audits, 28 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 859 (1994) (discussing legal consciousness as the degree to which the rule of law 
is part of the socialization and habits of the population, in the sense that law is injected into 
daily routine and thereby structures social interaction).  Others discuss legal consciousness as 
a normative consensus about law and fairness. See TYLER, supra note 3; CAROL J. 
GREENHOUSE, PRAYING FOR JUSTICE: FAITH, ORDER, & COMMUNITY IN AN AMERICAN TOWN 
(Roger Sanjek ed., 1986); JOHN THIBAULT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975). Still others use “legal consciousness” to refer to the ways 
in which people discuss or experience law. See, e.g., PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN SILBEY, THE 
COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (William O’Barr & John M. Conley 
eds., 1998); JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM M. O’BARR, RULES VERSUS RELATIONSHIPS: THE 
ETHNOGRAPHY OF LEGAL DISCOURSE (William O’Barr & John M. Conley eds., 1990). I use the 
term as Stalans & Kinsey define it. 
83To illustrate this point, consider what David Engel characterized as a decline of legal 
consciousness in northern Thailand.  Engel, supra note 81, at 469. During the period between 
1975, when he conducted initial field research, and 1998 through 2004 when he conducted a 
second study, he found tort victims in Chiangmai had become less inclined to pursue judicial 
remedies and tended to rationalize their decisions through Buddhist teachings. Id. at 469- 472. 
He attributed this disinclination to globalization. Id. Engel’s data, however, reflect not that his 
subjects had become less conscious of their legal rights, but less motivated to pursue legal 
remedies. They used religious language and precepts to rationalize what were pragmatic 
decisions in light of the cost and corruption of the local judicial system. Engel’s results also 
may have been influenced by the religion he chose to study, because Buddhism, above most 
other religions, stresses mind-state rather than compliance with laws that govern worldly 
conduct. 
84An example is the requirement in Judaism of a minyan, a group of ten adults that is a 
requisite for formal prayer.  Mourners cannot perform their obligation under religious law to 
recite the mourner’s prayer (Kaddish Yatom) without a minyan. See ABRAHAM MILLGRAM, 
JEWISH WORSHIP 155 (1971); ROSENBERG, supra note 33, at 50. The minyan requirement both 
reinforces the community and satisfies the need of mourners to be assuaged. Id. Analogous 
laws in other religions require individuals to have a spiritual advisor or mentor or to 
participate in group missionary work. 
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jury duty, or voting in elections, and to comply with laws prohibiting acts against the 
national security. 
Where rules coincide with social norms, motivation comes from the same sources 
as the norms: education, family life, peer group influence.  Norms function through 
inculcated self-regulatory mechanisms,85 such as internalized moral principles.86  
Because norms are held by a peer or reference group, compliance with norms also 
may be driven by fear that one will be punished, shamed or shunned by that group if 
she fails to comply with its norms; though norms usually act to increase motivation, 
they may be enforced through extrinsic control where motivation is lacking.87 
However, norms are an imperfect source of motivation for intrinsic control.  
They are not universally and thoroughly inculcated in people, that is why society has 
its rebels, misfits, and ne’er-do-wells who are motivated to violate norms.  
Moreover, laws and norms are not always consistent with each other.  One need only 
consider the laws banning marijuana use to acknowledge this truism. 
Legitimacy is another source of motivation for intrinsic control.88  Tyler’s classic 
study of the legitimacy of the court system89 showed that people are more willing to 
comply with a law or recognize the validity of a decision, even against self-interest, 
if they believe the law or decision was arrived at in a procedurally just fashion in 
which those affected were afforded a fair chance to be heard and like cases were 
treated alike.  However, people’s trust in authority figures or institutions may falter, 
or, as in the case of highway speed limits, a norm—e.g., “it’s okay to go ten miles 
over the limit, everyone else does”—or personal need or convenience may dictate 
non-compliance with rules despite the legitimacy of the institution that made the 
rule. 
Motivational law both reinforces other sources of motivation for intrinsic control 
and may fill the gap where other sources of motivation prove inadequate to bring 
                                                                
85See Tom R. Tyler, Patrick E. Callahan & Jeffrey Frost, Armed, and Dangerous (?): 
Motivating Rule Adherence Among Agents of Social Control, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 457, 462-
63 (2007); TYLER, supra note 3, at 165. 
86Cf. W. Bradley Wendel, Morality, Motivation and the Professionalism Movement, 52 
S.C. L. REV. 557, 593 (2001). 
87See Note, Shame, Stigma and Crime: Evaluating the Efficacy of Shaming Sanctions in 
Criminal Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2186, 2207 (2003) (“Shaming can be a cheaper and more 
effective punishment than imprisonment for low-level offenders.”); Christopher S. Elmendorf, 
Ideas, Incentives, Gifts and Governance: Toward Conservation Stewardship of Private Land, 
in Cultural and Psychological Perspective, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 423, 461 n.215 (2003) 
(summarizing social psychological studies of the importance of reference and peer group 
influence in social control).  The effectiveness of shunning or the threat of shunning in 
motivating behavior probably has neurobiological underpinnings.  Cf. Naomi I. Eisenberger, 
Matthew D. Lieberman, & Kipling D. Williams, Does Rejection Hurt?: An fMRI Study of 
Social Exclusion, SCIENCE, Oct. 10, 2003, at 290 (finding emotional pain experienced due to 
social exclusion involves the same portions of the brain as physical pain). 
88See Richard Fallon, Legitimacy and The Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1852-53 
(2005); see also Cary Coglianese, Legitimacy and Corporate Governance, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
159, 160 (2007). 
89TYLER, supra note 3, 20-22, and authorities cited by Tyler.  Tyler’s later work has given 
more detailed guidance regarding those factors that contribute to the perception of fairness.  
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about compliance or tend to induce non-compliance.  Norms and legitimacy may 
drive compliance with laws that are consistent with normative behavior and imposed 
by a trusted authority, but laws can either reinforce or counteract normative 
influences by creating incentives or the perception of incentives for compliance, 
making it easier or more feasible for people to comply, reinforcing trust in the source 
of the law, or mandating or inducing people to act in ways that make them more 
inclined to comply.   
III.  HOW MOTIVATIONAL LAW WORKS 
A.  Motivational Law as Intrinsic Social Control 
Macchiavelli observed that governments cannot govern without the goodwill of 
their subjects.90  Tom R. Tyler has echoed this insight: “[T]he viability of legal 
authorities in a democratic society depends upon their ability to secure voluntary 
compliance with the law. . . .The legal system has, at best, a limited ability to compel 
people to obey the law and is heavily dependent on widespread voluntary 
cooperation with judicial directives.”91 
Tyler and others have distinguished extrinsic from intrinsic social controls.92  
Extrinsic, or instrumental, controls include traditional command-and-control 
structures which function through sanctions and the threat of sanctions, and 
sometimes through reward and the promise of reward.  Intrinsic controls function 
through the self-motivation of citizens to comply with rules, independent of 
sanctions or reward. 
Command-and-control structures strain available resources; pointing guns at 
people to coerce compliance demands reliable manpower and firepower, and 
governments cannot point guns at all of their citizens, all the time.  Extrinsic controls 
cannot succeed in the absence of some degree of intrinsic control.  Intrinsic controls 
back up extrinsic controls when extrinsic controls fail, and reduce the likelihood that 
they will fail. 
Motivational law is central to this back-up system of intrinsic controls.  It is 
supposed to increase motivation to comply with regulatory law, but what motivates 
compliance with the motivational law?  If motivational law merely shifted a 
government’s gun-pointing from coercing compliance with one type of law I have 
called “regulatory” to coercing compliance with another type of law called 
“motivational,” motivational law would make little sense.  One answer is that 
motivational law increases the probability of compliance with regulatory law by 
increasing the number of ways in which, and often, the number of persons through 
whom, compliance can be achieved. 
As an example, women’s compliance with the motivational laws of hijab is 
supposed to protect them by affecting men’s behavior, causing men to be more 
                                                                
90See NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE Ch. III (Harvey C. Mansfield trans., Univ. of 
Chicago Press 2d ed. 1998) (“Although one may be very strong in armed forces, yet in 
entering a province one has always need of the goodwill of the natives.”). 
91Tom R. Tyler, Multiculturalism and the Willingness of Citizens to Defer to Law and to 
Legal Authorities, 25 LAW & SOC. INQ. 983, 984 (2000) (emphasis in the original). 
92For a recent summary of the literature drawing this distinction, see Tyler, Callahan & 
Frost, supra note 85, at 461-63.  
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motivated to obey laws against adultery, rape and sexual abuse, which according to 
my definition are “regulatory” laws.93  A Muslim woman might be motivated to 
comply with the rules of hijab because she genuinely feels that compliance will 
protect her from rape and abuse, but she could have several other motives.  She 
might otherwise risk punishment by her government, as in theocratic Iran, or believe 
she would be punished by Allah.  She might comply because she fears shunning, as a 
statement of her ethnic identity, or because she believes in the legitimacy of Allah’s 
wisdom and that Allah’s purpose in commanding her to comply with hijab is 
irrelevant.  She might comply with hijab because she is motivated by her compliance 
with other motivational laws such as salat (the Islamic prayer ritual repeated five 
times daily), by habit, or by self-interest, e.g., protection from the sun. 
Why, then, use hijab as motivational law, rather than simply relying on threat of 
punishment, Allah’s legitimacy, fear of community rejection, habit or self-interest to 
obtain compliance with Islamic laws on extramarital sex, rape and sexual abuse?  
Men may not respond to threats of punishment, they may not believe in Allah or in 
the likelihood of divine punishment (or that belief might be insufficient deterrent to 
affect their behavior), and community rejection, habit and self-interest often fail to 
prevent sexual abuse and other conduct targeted by the laws of hijab.  Hijab is 
supposed to provide a second set of controls if men otherwise cannot control 
themselves. 
B.  Psychological Mechanisms of Motivational Law 
1.  Cognitive Dissonance 
Behavioral and cognitive reasons for compliance include behavioral 
conditioning, e.g., if the law mandates conduct which individuals have learned to 
regard as normative or that has become habitual, or otherwise embedded in the 
subconscious mind;94 and neural structure,95 if the law mandates behaviors consistent 
with those selected by the cognitive and decision-making apparatuses of the human 
brain under similar circumstances.96   
                                                                
93See text at note 73. 
94See Jeremy Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting, 
80 IND. L. J. 155 (2005); Adam J. Hirsch, Evolutionary Theories of Common Law Efficiency: 
Reasons for (Cognitive) Skepticism, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 425 (2005); MICHAEL A. BISHOP & 
J.D. TROUT, EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN JUDGMENT (2005); Alfred F. 
MacKay, Human Motivation: The Inadequacy of Economists’ Models, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
441 (1981). 
95Neuroeconomics is casting new light on how the functioning of the brain affects the 
perception and efficacy of deterrents and rewards.  See generally John Cassidy, Mind Games: 
What Neuroeconomics Tells Us About Money and the Brain, NEW YORKER, Sept. 18, 2006, at 
30; STEVEN R. QUARTZ & TERRENCE J. SEJNOWSKI, LIARS, LOVERS AND HEROES: WHAT THE 
NEW BRAIN SCIENCE REVEALS ABOUT HOW WE BECOME WHO WE ARE (2002); PAUL W. 
GLIMCHER, DECISIONS, UNCERTAINTY AND THE BRAIN: THE SCIENCE OF NEUROECONOMICS 
(2003). 
96See Terrence Chorvat & Kevin McCabe, Neuroeconomics and Rationality, 80 CHI.-
KENT L. Rev. 1235, 1252 (2005); Terrence Chorvat, Kevin McCabe & Vernon Smith, Law 
and Neuroeconomics, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 35, 54-61 (2005); Peter A. Alces, On 
Discovering Doctrine: “Justice” in Contract Agreement, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 471, 477-78 
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Cognitive dissonance may be the key cognitive mechanism at work in 
motivational law.  According to Festinger’s original theory of cognitive dissonance,97 
cognitive inconsistencies of sufficient magnitude induce an aversive motivational 
state—cognitive dissonance—in which an individual will attempt to alter his or her 
cognition or behavior so as to reduce the inconsistency.  More recent studies suggest 
cognitive discrepancy motivates people committed to a behavior or belief to engage 
in information processing that supports their commitment.  The discrepancy 
undermines the potential for effective action consistent with the commitment, in that 
action undertaken in a conflicted mind-state is not likely to be as effective as action 
undertaken in a condition of certainty.98  If dissonant information overcomes a 
certain threshold, the level of which depends on the strength of the commitment and 
the volume and strength of the non-dissonant information, the individual will be 
motivated to alter her behavior or belief.99 
Motivational laws function in a number of ways that can be explained in terms of 
cognitive dissonance theory.  Some work by screening out discrepant information.  
Political censorship laws are supposed to screen out discrepant information and 
enable propaganda and indoctrination to build commitment to actions consistent with 
those mandated by the regime, and belief supporting that commitment.  Obscenity 
laws and religious laws such as hijab are supposed to prevent emotional arousal from 
visual stimuli.  They also, in theory, enable religious institutions and other sources of 
moral instruction to build commitment to beliefs that upon arousal, would create 
dissonance and thereby restrain abusive action.  The consideration requirement for 
formation of a contract is supposed to create a discrepancy between one’s act in 
signing a contract that pronounces its seriousness through the recital of 
consideration, and any internal reservations about the seriousness of that act, so that 
if a party to a contract in the process of formation harbors such reservations, he or 
she will be motivated to take some action to reduce or eliminate the discrepancy, 
e.g., by disclosing those reservations or declining to sign the contract.  Similarly, 
military disciplinary rules are supposed to create a commitment to—indeed, a habit 
of—obeying orders that is sufficiently powerful to motivate soldiers to do so even in 
the face of information in battle that seems to make such obedience foolhardy. 
Motivational law has a built-in advantage as a tool to build commitment to 
compliance with regulatory laws, to the extent it is enforceable by sanctions.  
Motivational law takes advantage of the motivation created by the threat of sanctions 
to build commitment to a motivational behavior that, in turn, builds commitment to 
the behavior that is the objective of regulatory law.  For instance, if a soldier fails to 
salute a superior officer, the soldier may be punished.  The threat of punishment 
                                                           
(2005); Nina Mazar & Dan Ariely, Dishonesty in Everyday Life and Its Policy Implications, 
2006 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 117 (2006).  
97LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957). 
98Eddie Harmon-Jones, A Cognitive Dissonance Theory Perspective on Persuasion, in 
THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 99, 107 (James Price 
Dillard & Michael Pfau eds., 2002). The neural bases for cognitive dissonance theory are 
further explored in a recent collection of articles on the subject. EDDIE HARMON-JONES & 
PIOTR WINKIELMAN, SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE: INTEGRATING BIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL 
EXPLANATIONS OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (Eddie Harmon-Jones & Piotr Winkielman eds., 2007). 
99Harmon-Jones, supra note 98, at 107. 
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motivates soldiers to salute, and saluting, in turn, builds commitment to compliance 
with the orders of the officers whom they salute.  Disobeying someone whom one 
regularly salutes, on pain of punishment for failure to salute, would create significant 
cognitive dissonance, so soldiers will be motivated instead to engage in information 
processing that supports their commitment to compliance. 
Cognitive dissonance, however, also can weaken compliance with motivational 
law.  For example, speed limits on the highways have a motivational function.  Many 
highways designed to safely accommodate traffic moving at 80 m.p.h. are posted 
with 55 or 60 m.p.h. speed limits, ostensibly for the purpose of ensuring that drivers 
do not drive at an unsafe speed and thereby endanger others.  However, drivers going 
70 m.p.h. know, or at least, believe based on their perception of the highway itself 
that their speed is not really unsafe.  Even traffic officers share this belief, so they 
typically choose to ticket drivers whose speed is more than five or ten m.p.h. beyond 
the speed limit rather than drivers two or three m.p.h. over the limit.  The 
motivational speed limits are ignored due to the dissonance created by the 
discrepancy between designed-for-80 and speed-limit-60. 
2.  Shaming, Moral Community-Building, and Regulatory Communities 
Empirical evidence points, albeit equivocally, to the “moral community” or 
“reference group” as a key element in the functioning of motivational law.100  Studies 
in regulatory theory have revealed that shaming and the threat of shaming appear to 
function better as a deterrent than the threat of physical punishment, but the threat of 
shaming alters behavior only if the individual is concerned about his or her 
reputation in a community.101 
Many motivational laws rely on community-building and the threat of shaming 
for their effectiveness.  Certainly it is an element in the effectiveness of military 
disciplinary rules that they render disobedience of orders shameful in the eyes of 
one’s fellow soldiers.  Religious codes of dress, ritual and diet function within 
religious moral communities and also serve to bind those communities together.  If 
the moral community dissolves, so does compliance with its motivational laws.  
Compliance with Jewish dietary laws, for example, is limited to a small minority of 
American Jews, mostly in Orthodox religious communities.  Meanwhile, the 
American Jewish community is diminishing in strength as a moral community, 
though it remains an ethnic minority.  Shunning and excommunication are 
formalized versions of shaming used in some religious communities, though they are 
less common today in mainstream religion.102 
The threat of humiliation often leads wrongdoers to attempt to conceal their 
actions despite the lack of formal punishment.  Communities of the religiously 
observant typically exist within a larger society, and concealment—e.g., of domestic 
abuse—may be condoned and even abetted by others within the community in order 
to avoid a collective loss of face.103 
                                                                
100See infra Part IV.B. 
101See Toni L. Massaro, Shame, Culture and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 
1880, 1883 (1991). 
102See generally infra note 114. 
103See Massaro, supra note 101, Part IV.C.  
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The success of a non-coercive “soft law” approach104 to secular regulation 
depends on whether the regulated actor is motivated to cooperate with its regulators 
in order to save face among, or conform to the behavior of, his or her peers or based 
on positive feelings toward the regulators.  Soft law works because it motivates 
regulated actors to comply with regulatory law, and it motivates regulated actors 
better if they are part of a regulatory community.  That regulatory community may 
consist of peers who are subject to the same regulatory laws, or it may consist of 
both peers and the regulators themselves.  By making the regulated actor fear being 
shamed in the eyes of that regulatory community, soft law motivates compliance 
with hard law. 
Thus, nursing home operators are more likely to comply with regulatory 
requirements if they find non-compliance shameful in the eyes of their peers than if 
they are threatened with coercive action.105  Some corporations in the forest products 
industry comply with forest certification rules drafted by a non-profit group with 
industry participation, not because the rules are favorable to the industry, but because 
they “could not afford to get a bad name . . . .”106 
Mandatory arrest of alleged domestic abusers tends to increase, not decrease, 
domestic violence among men who do not find arrest shameful, while it reduces 
domestic violence among those who do.107  Compliance with a request or demand is 
more likely if the subject likes the requester or perceives that others comply.108  
                                                                
104The dichotomy between hard and soft law is problematic.  See TYLER, supra note 3.  
Regulators seldom take a uniform hard or soft law approach when they interface with the 
persons whose activities they are responsible for regulating.  More often bank examiners or 
nursing home inspectors employed by the same regulatory agency, for example, resemble the 
old cartoon characters Mutt and Jeff or a “good cop, bad cop” routine, some bearing goodwill 
and “soft law” and others readily brandishing the club of “hard law” and enforcement action.  
Whether the good cops or bad cops will prevail in administrative agency-level decision-
making depends a great degree on the political and policy persuasions of those in higher 
positions within the agency.  Moreover, the decision whether to send out good cops or bad 
cops, or some of each, to examine, inspect or monitor a regulated actor is often a conscious 
judgment made by a supervisor based on input from prior examinations or inspections.  A 
supervisor who perceives the regulated actor as motivated to comply, and therefore likely to 
act cooperatively and in good faith with respect to the regulatory process, is likely to send an 
examiner or inspector who takes a motivational “New Governance” approach, while if the 
supervisor making the assignment perceives the regulated actor as motivated not to comply, 
and therefore untrustworthy, he or she is likely to assign an examiner or inspector who takes a 
more adversarial “hard law” approach.  Id.  
105Makkai and Braithwaite found that what they term “reintegrative shaming” was more 
effective than stigmatization, i.e., labeling the individual as evil (as through coercive action or 
the threat of such action), in obtaining increased legal compliance by nursing homes.  See Toni 
Makkai & John Braithwaite, Reintegrative Shaming and Compliance with Regulatory 
Standards, 32 CRIMINOLOGY 361, 361 (1994).   
106See Errol E. Meidinger, The New Environmental Law: Forest Certification, 10 BUFF. 
ENVTL. L.J. 211, 299 (2002) (quoting forest industry representative as saying his company 
would comply with standards on forest certification drafted by the Forest Stewardship 
Council, a non-profit group). 
107LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., POLICING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: EXPERIMENTS AND 
DILEMMAS 1-2 (1992); Makkai & Braithwaite, supra note 105, at 363-64.   
108Robert B. Cialdini & Melanie R. Trost, Social Influence: Social Norms, Conformity, 
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Compliance does increase when threats are made, but only if the threats are public 
and the opportunity to comply is private, suggesting that shame rather than fear is the 
principal factor in increasing compliance.109  If shaming is ongoing and does not 
offer the wrongdoer a means of reintegration, as through a ceremony celebrating a 
return to compliance, the ties of the wrongdoer with the relevant group are weakened 
and the wrongdoer simply decides he or she doesn’t care anymore what the group 
thinks. 
C.  Motivational Law as Legitimacy-Builder in Religious and Secular Governance 
People are more likely to comply with a rule or principle if they regard the 
authority issuing the rule or principle as legitimate.  Motivational law, in turn, can 
contribute to building legitimacy.  The term “legitimacy”, however, often is misused 
in ways that obscure its motivational function.110  Tom R. Tyler defines legitimacy as 
“a conception of obligation to obey any commands an authority issues so long as that 
authority is acting within appropriate limits.”111  “‘Legitimacy’ connotes a faith or 
trust in individuals, procedures, and/or organizations.  It denotes the ability to make 
people think that a claim to obedience is self-evident . . . .”112   
When the term “legitimacy” is used to refer to a constitutional provision, statute 
or judicial decision, it is not only different from the use of the term to refer to a 
government or other authority, it is a misuse of the term that obscures its 
                                                           
and Compliance, in II HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 151, 151-81 (Daniel T. Gilbert et 
al. eds., 4th ed. 1998). 
109Amy Kaplan & Joachim Krueger, Compliance After Threat: Self-Affirmation or Self-
Presentatation [sic]? 4 CURRENT RESEARCH IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 178, 179, 192 (1999), 
available at http://www.uiowa.edu/~grpproc/crisp/crisp.4.7.htm.   See also Christopher S. 
Elmendorf, Ideas, Incentives, Gifts and Governance: Toward Conservation Stewardship of 
Private Land, in Cultural and Psychological Perspective, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 423, 461-62 
(2003). 
110Richard Fallon distinguishes among legal, sociological and moral uses of the term 
“legitimacy.”  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
1787, 1794-96 (2005), citing MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 33-38 (Guenther Roth & 
Claus Wittich, eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., 1968) and Joseph Bensman, Max Weber’s 
Concept of Legitimacy: An Evaluation, in CONFLICT AND CONTROL: CHALLENGE TO 
LEGITIMACY OF MODERN GOVERNMENTS 17 (Arthur J. Vidich & Ronald M. Glassman eds., 
1979). Fallon’s description of the sociological use of the term is off the mark.  According to 
Fallon, “[w]hen legitimacy is measured in sociological terms, a constitutional regime, 
governmental institution, or official decision possesses legitimacy in a strong sense insofar as 
the relevant public regards it as justified, appropriate, or otherwise deserving of support for 
reasons beyond fear of sanctions or mere hope for personal reward.”  Id. at 1795 (emphasis in 
original).  However, people may harbor a variety of motives for complying with an order of a 
government apart from fear of sanctions and hope of reward, some of which have nothing to 
do with the government’s legitimacy.  People may comply out of fear of shunning or shaming 
by a relevant community or reference group, or due to inculcated norms or habits, or out of 
self-interest, which is not synonymous with the “hope of reward.”  See also infra note 113. 
111TYLER, supra note 3, at 26. 
112Paul H. Brietzke, Law, Legitimacy and Coercion: One View from Law and Economics, 
25 VAL. U. L. REV. 343, 344 n.2 (1990). 
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motivational meaning.113  A statute or court or agency decision cannot be 
“legitimate” or “illegitimate,” but it can be legal or illegal, moral or immoral.  
However, an authority is legitimate if a relevant group is generally motivated to 
accept its claim to obedience without questioning its legal or moral justification.  
What is important here is that some laws possess the purpose or function of 
increasing legitimacy by instilling faith and trust in an authority, whether 
government or god, legislature or court, institution or individual, in order to motivate 
people to obey the orders and decisions of that authority.  These laws are 
motivational laws.  For example, as discussed above in Part II.B, the requirement of 
due process has a motivational function that serves to reinforce the legitimacy of the 
judicial system, and the laws of the United Kingdom and other monarchies regarding 
royal privileges exist largely to lend legitimacy to the government in order to 
motivate citizens to obey its other laws. 
Religious lawmakers, like secular ones, confront the problem of establishing and 
preserving legitimacy, but they must resolve it differently.  In religious organizations 
other than theocracies and cults, instrumental motivation must involve divine 
sanctions and rewards, and functions only to the extent that adherents have 
internalized a belief in the existence and efficacy of such sanctions and rewards.  
Only the true believer will be deterred by the risk of divine punishment, and belief in 
the divine—the “legitimacy” of divine authority in a sociological sense—is a 
variable and fickle thing susceptible to doubt.   
Not all religious laws lack earthly coercive enforcement.  Theocracies, of course, 
have the ability to resort to coercion because they hold the powers of government, 
and cults, though they are not governments, have coercive power through both 
mental and physical control of their members when such power in the hands of a 
private organization is tolerated by government or when government is too weak to 
interfere with it.  In religious communities such as the Mennonites, Mormons, 
Jehovah’s Witnesses and Korean churches, the threat of excommunication and 
shunning may be effective to deter violations of religious laws,114 though such 
sanctions are little used today in mainstream Judaism115 and Christianity.116  Islam 
                                                                
113Fallon elevates misuse of the word “legitimate” to alternative uses.  Fallon, supra note 
110, at 1794.  If “[t]hat which is lawful is also legitimate,” there can be no such thing as “legal 
legitimacy.”  Id.  Conduct either is lawful or it is not, though the term “illegitimate” is often 
misused as a synonym for “unlawful” or to give emphasis to how clearly unlawful something 
is.  Fallon makes a similar mistake in discussing moral “legitimacy:” “When the term is used 
in a moral sense, legitimacy is a function of moral justifiability or respect-worthiness.”  Id. at 
1796.  The fact that some misuse the term as a synonym for “morally justified” does not make 
the usage proper. 
114See generally Paul v. Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc’y, Inc., 819 F.2d 875, 877 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (discussing the “disfellowship” of church member); Bear v. Reformed Mennonite 
Church, 341 A.2d 105, 106 (Pa. 1975) (discussing community-wide ostracism of critic of 
church doctrine); Lide v. Miller, 573 S.W. 2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (discussing alleged 
ruin of dental practice following shunning of dentist by church); Justin K. Miller, Comment, 
Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don’t: Religious Shunning and the Free Exercise Clause, 
137 U. PA. L. REV. 271 (1988); Daniel Bahk, Note, Excommunication and Shunning: The 
Effect on Korean Churches in America as a Networking Social Structure, 3 RUTGERS J.L. & 
RELIGION 4 (2001). 
115Excommunication, or cherem, virtually ended outside the ultra-Orthodox sects of 
Judaism after the Enlightenment as local Jewish communities in Europe lost their prior self-
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continues to use excommunication (takfir) as in the case of Salman Rushdie, 
although a body of Islamic scholars convened by King Abdullah II of Jordan in 2005 
issued a statement opposing the practice.117 
In law-based religions such as Judaism and Islam, legitimacy depends on the 
rulemaker’s convincing adherents or the religious hierarchy that he or she either is 
authorized by the divine sovereign to make rules, or that he or she is more expert 
than others in interpreting and applying the words of the divine sovereign.  In Iran, 
rulemaking authority is vested in the Council of Experts, a body of 86 scholars of the 
Qu’ran and Ahadith.  Hasidic rebbes were originally selected based on knowledge of 
the Bible, Talmud and medieval religious codes and commentaries.  In Roman 
Catholicism, the elected Pope is considered to be the authorized intermediary 
between God and man.  In non-law-based religions such as evangelical Christianity, 
a preacher’s charisma is more important in motivating compliance than practices 
institutionalized by motivational law.  Motivational laws are marginalized and the 
search for religious experience and congregational dynamics predominate.118 
The process of choosing and replacing religious rulemakers also differs in 
theocracies.  In a religious hierarchy based on expertise, a fortiori only other experts 
are qualified to make decisions about who possesses the necessary qualifications to 
be a rulemaker.  Rulemaking in law-based religions therefore is inherently un-
democratic.  Such hierarchies also are self-generating, an endless sequence of experts 
choosing other experts. 
The second issue rulemakers must confront is how to proceed in making rules.  
There are no elected legislatures in Judaism or Islam, apart from theocratic Islamic 
states in which religious “experts” have veto power regarding candidacies, and the 
objective of the theocratic regime may ultimately be to restore the caliphate.119  
Moreover, in both religions, in theory the rules of religious law have already been set 
                                                           
governing status.   
116For example, Catholic bishops rejected excommunication of Catholic politicians who 
support funding for abortions as “counterproductive.”  See Thomas J. Reese, S.J., Bishops 
Meet in Baltimore, AMERICA, Nov. 25, 1989, available at http://woodstock.georgetown.edu/ 
church_studies/reese/america/nc8911.htm. 
117The statement was called the “Amman Message” and is available at http://www.amman 
message.com/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2007). 
118In religions such as Reconstructionist Judaism and many of the Protestant 
denominations (e.g., Lutheranism, Presbyterianism, Unitarianism, and the Society of Friends 
(Quakers), individual congregations are given considerable autonomy in making their own 
rules.  Even Martin Luther, however, intended that his liturgical innovations, principally the 
singing of Psalms in the vernacular, would “reinforce popular belief in Evangelical theology.”  
Harold J. Berman, The Spiritualization of Secular Law: The Impact of the Lutheran 
Reformation, 14 J.L. & RELIGION 313, 322 n.29 (1999).  
119In Iran, the elected Council of Experts consists of eighty-six members.  The Council of 
Experts elects the President, who appoints the Guardian Council.  The Guardian Council, so 
named because it is the “guardian” of the Islamic Revolution, decides who can be a candidate 
for the Council of Experts, acting as a filter through which only a handful of candidates who 
are considered sufficiently observant and knowledgeable about Islam can pass.  Pepe Escobar, 
The Roving Eye: The Ultimate Martyr, ASIA TIMES, Mar. 31, 2006, available at 
http://www/atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HC31Ak03.html.  For an insightful look at the 
political situation in Iran, see id. 
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both in divine writings and by ancient and medieval scholars,120 it remains only for 
religious courts121 and prominent scholars to interpret and apply them.122  
Contemporary rulemaking in law-based religions is delegated to a religious judiciary 
and to influential bodies of scholars.   
Secular governmental rulemakers must be concerned with the process of 
contemporary rulemaking, such as the rule drafting process, soliciting public input, 
and publicizing new rules in the interest both of compliance and due process.  The 
job of rule formulation and publicizing new rules has largely been completed in 
Judaism and Islam.  Religions primarily must be concerned about the preservation of 
rules, while governments must be concerned with their formulation.   
Secular regulators possess means of compelling enforcement that organized 
religions do not.  A rabbi or an imam cannot go to a U.S. court and obtain an 
injunction to compel a shop owner, even one of their congregants, to sell only kosher 
or halal meat.  A government or governmental agency like the United States Food 
and Drug Administration, on the other hand, could obtain an injunction to compel the 
same shop owner to sell only meat that satisfies secular standards governing 
slaughter and preparation. 
IV.  FAILURES AND SUCCESSES OF MOTIVATIONAL LAW: DOES IT REALLY WORK? 
A.  Motivational Law’s Failures 
A glance at the examples of motivational law in Part II of this Article should 
leave the reader wondering, “Does motivational law ever actually work?”   
-  Parties to contracts routinely ignore pro forma recitals of “in consideration for 
one dollar receipt of which is hereby acknowledged,” and the evils of people not 
understanding the seriousness of the contracts they sign persist.123 
                                                                
120In Judaism, most of the existing body of religious law was created by the rabbis of the 
Mishnah and Talmud, who lived between 200 B.C.E. and 500 C.E., and by medieval 
commentators who followed them.  This body of religious law was codified between the 12th 
and 16th centuries, most authoritatively in the Shulhan Arukh (“Set Table”), completed by 
Rabbi Joseph Caro in 1555, and in The Mappah (“Tablecloth”), a set of notes to the Shulhan 
Arukh written by Rabbi Moses Isserles of Krakow in the late 16th century which reflected the 
differences between the Sephardic and Ashkenazic Jewish traditions.  JUDAH GRIBETZ ET AL., 
THE TIMETABLE OF JEWISH HISTORY 165 (1993).  For another important codification of Jewish 
law, see MOSES MAIMONIDES, THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES: MISHNEH TORAH (Menachem 
Kellner trans., Yale Univ. Press 2004) (1135).  
121In Judaism, a religious court is called a beit din, or “house of justice” and consists of 
three members.  Islam has Shari’a courts with a similar function.   
122Regarding the principles of Jewish law as construed by scholars, see José Faur, The 
Fundamental Principles of Jewish Jurisprudence, 12 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 225 (1979).  
In Islam, the Qu’ran and the memorized teachings of Muhammed and his followers (Ahadith) 
are construed according to rules of Islamic jurisprudence called fiqh, of which there are 
several schools of thought (Maddhab).  For a more detailed discussion of the sources of 
Islamic law, see Ahmed Souaiaia, On the Sources of Islamic Law and Practices, 20 J.L. & 
RELIGION 123 (2004). 
123Consumers routinely fail to read or understand the substantive terms of contracts.  
Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-Standard 
Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837, 841-42 (2006); Jeff Sovern, Toward a New Model 
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-  Evidence that obscenity laws have impacted either the demand for pornography 
or the frequency of rape and other forms of aggression against women is at best 
equivocal.124   
-  Military disciplinary rules failed to prevent the torture of prisoners at Abu 
Ghraib.   
-  Only a small percentage of Jews and Catholics comply with religious laws on 
dress, diet, prayer and ritual.  Islamic religious laws on dress, diet, prayer and ritual 
have become political rallying points for fundamentalism and theocratic rule. 
-  An industry of predatory “consumer credit counseling” businesses that used 
deceptive tactics to sell debtors “debt management plans” was given additional 
leverage over consumers by BAPCPA’s credit counseling requirement,125 and the 
number of consumer bankruptcies is again rising rapidly despite BAPCPA.126 
-  Public support for the British royal family—and presumably, therefore, the 
impact of royalty as a motivator for compliance with law—is at a new low.127 
Though widely used, motivational law often fails.  Moreover, where the linkage 
between motivational and regulatory law is weak or ambiguous, or where the 
regulatory law is not perceived as yielding benefits commensurate with the burdens 
imposed by motivational law, social tensions result.  Abu Ghraib, the controversy 
concerning obscenity laws and pornography, and the debate within Islam over the 
wearing of hijab are three examples.   
One common barrier to motivational law’s effectiveness is what might be termed 
the “dilution” problem.  The Pledge of Allegiance that most American public schools 
require students to recite at the beginning of the school day often provokes giggles 
rather than patriotism because it is not integrated into a system of motivational laws 
that pervades students’ lives.  Any motivational effect is lost, diluted beyond 
recognition by the other 99% of the school day’s activities.   
Many other barriers exist to motivational law’s effective use in governance in the 
United States, of which the following are a few: 
1.  The “hard law” tradition of regulation.  A tradition of command-and-control 
and “hard law” regulation, though changing, still prevails in many regulatory 
agencies.   
2.  The cult of notice.  American laws rooted in the concept of due process 
emphasize the giving of notice rather than its effectiveness in generating motivation.  
                                                           
of Consumer Protection: The Problem of Inflated Transaction Costs, 47 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1635, 1657-59 (2006). 
124See supra note 21. 
125Gross & Block-Lieb, supra note 45, at 554-59.  In fairness, the predatory practices long 
predated BAPCPA, and BAPCPA purported to regulate the industry by giving the Executive 
Office of U.S. Trustees approval authority over credit counseling agencies.  However, 
regulation was a hollow promise, since the approval process relies heavily on certification by 
trade organizations rather than effective monitoring of the business practices of credit 
counseling agencies.  Id. 
126Case filings by individuals or households with consumer debt increased 48.34% to 
391,105 for the six months ending June 30, 2007, compared to 272,602 cases filed in the six 
months ending June 30, 2006.  AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE UPDATE (Am. Bankr. Inst.), 
Aug. 16, 2007. 
127See supra note 59.   
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An extreme example of this cult of notice is the fine print disclosures of credit terms 
flashed on the television screen for impossibly brief moments, all in compliance with 
the Truth in Lending Act.128   
3.  The pictorial superiority effect.  Studies of cognition demonstrate that the 
written word is less effective than pictures to communicate concepts and motivate a 
response.129  American regulators, however, consistently use the written word to 
motivate consumers.  Product warning labels are notoriously ineffective, in part 
because they use words rather than pictures to convey information about the product.   
B.  Does Religious Motivational Law Work?  The Hellfire Controversy 
Probably no aspect of motivational law’s effectiveness has undergone more study 
by social scientists than whether observance of religious law motivates people to 
refrain from violating criminal laws.  Six principal hypotheses have been advanced 
by sociologists concerning religiosity and delinquency:  
The Hellfire Hypothesis posits that a belief in supernatural punishments and 
rewards deters criminal behavior and promotes normative behavior.130 Religious 
belief, though not necessarily religious activity, should be associated with a 
reduction in delinquency with respect to crimes disapproved of by religious 
teachings. 
Social control (or social bonding) theory:131 Religion promotes compliance even 
with laws that are not a topic of religious teachings.  Participation in religion is a 
form of attachment, commitment and involvement which increases the stakes in 
conformity and encourages the belief that societal norms should be obeyed. 
The “anti-asceticism” theory: Religiosity, measured by participation in religious 
activities, has a stronger inverse effect on actions such as alcohol and drug use that 
run counter to religious traditions of asceticism but are condoned or only 
ambiguously condemned by secular influences.132 
                                                                
128Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §1601 (1968).  See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 432-
33, 446 (2002) ("Businesses . . . know[] that consumers reliably, predictably, and completely 
fail to read the terms employed in standard-form contracts. . . . Businesses also can create 
boilerplate that is difficult to read by using small print, a light font, and all-capital lettering and 
by burying important terms in the middle of the form."); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, 
Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and 
Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1389 (1983) ("[C]onsumers may not understand the 
legal relationships that their purchase contracts create because they do not read the language in 
those contracts. Firms have an incentive to exploit this ignorance by using 'hidden' terms that 
will disadvantage consumers if circumstances cause these terms to be invoked."). 
129This is called the “pictorial superiority effect.”  See Douglas L. Nelson et al., Pictorial 
Superiority Effect, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. LEARNING & MEMORY 523, 523-528 
(1976); ALLAN PAIVIO, IMAGERY AND VERBAL PROCESSES (1971); ALLAN PAIVIO, MENTAL 
REPRESENTATIONS: A DUAL CODING APPROACH (Oxford psychology series; no. 9 1990). 
130See generally infra note 137. 
131TRAVIS HIRSCHI, CAUSES OF DELINQUENCY (1969).  Notably, Hirschi in 1990 moved 
away from social control theory and proposed a “self-control” theory that has not gained as 
much acceptance.  Id.  
132John K. Cochran & Ronald L. Akers, Beyond Hellfire: An Exploration of the Variable 
Effects of Religiosity on Adolescent Marijuana and Alcohol Use, 26 J. RES. IN CRIME & 
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Theory of secular social disorganization: “[W]hen secular moral guidelines are 
unavailable, in flux, or have lost their authority and hence their power to compel, the 
salience of religious proscriptions is enhanced.”133  Religion should have negligible 
additional impact on delinquency if secular social condemnation of an act is strong, 
but should make a difference if secular social condemnation is nonexistent or 
ambiguous. 
Arousal theory: Religious activity satisfies the individual’s neurobiological need 
for stimulation and prevents the boredom, or lack of neurological arousal, that leads 
individuals to engage in criminal activity.134 
“Moral community” theory:135 Religiosity has greater effect on individuals who 
are surrounded by, or affiliated with, a “moral community” in which their moral 
behavior will be reinforced and delinquency will result in shame and 
embarrassment.136  
In 1969, the first major empirical study of the relationship between religiosity 
and delinquency gave no support to any of these hypotheses.  In Hellfire and 
Delinquency137 Hirschi and Stark concluded that neither church attendance nor 
professed belief in supernatural sanctions bore a statistically significant relationship 
                                                           
DELINQ. 198 (1989). 
133Charles R. Tittle & Michael R. Welch, Religiosity and Deviance: Toward a 
Contingency Theory of Constraining Effects, 61 SOC. FORCES 653, 672 (1983). 
134John K. Cochran, Peter B. Wood & Bruce J. Arneklev, Is the Religiosity-Delinquency 
Relationship Spurious? A Test of Arousal and Social Control Theories, 31 J. RES. IN CRIME & 
DELINQ. 92 (1994) (finding arousal and social control theories explained levels of delinquency 
better than religiosity); Lee Ellis, Religiosity and Criminality from the Perspective of Arousal 
Theory, 24 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 215 (1987). 
135Moral community theory is derived from three sources.  Under “rational choice” theory, 
religious individuals are more likely to feel ashamed as a result of criminal acts and, due to 
their involvement in a religious community, are more likely to be embarrassed if those acts 
become known; hence they rationally will be deterred from criminal activity.  Under 
differential association theory, religious individuals will tend to select peers who share their 
religiosity, and this, in turn, will tend to socialize them in ways that promote kinds of behavior 
valued by their religion.  Reference group theory posits a similar dynamic as differential 
association theory, but adds that the reference group in which the individual is a member may 
start as a non-religious group and take on religious characteristics as individuals within it 
become more religious, or it may start as a religious group and lose its religiosity.  In other 
words, religious belief and observance will tend to spread throughout the reference group once 
introduced by a member; or conversely, secular or anti-religious belief and behavior will tend 
to spread once introduced by a member.  
136Social control, “rational choice,” differential association and reference group theories 
are not inconsistent as applied to religion.  Religious individuals instilled with an internal 
moral compass feel ashamed if they break the law and, to the extent that they are involved in 
religious institutions and a religious community, they will be embarrassed if word of wrong-
doing gets out to members of that community.  The prospect of shame and embarrassment, in 
turn, acts as a deterrent against breaking the law.  Differential association and reference group 
theories are a way of putting the same concept into the form of a process, though with greater 
emphasis on the processes by which non-religious individuals and groups may become 
religious.  
137Travis Hirschi & Rodney Stark, Hellfire and Delinquency, 17 SOC. PROBS. 202 (1969). 
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to delinquency.  Since Hellfire and Delinquency, social scientists have produced an 
average of more than two studies per year on the subject of the effect of religious 
belief and observance on crime,138 with wildly inconsistent outcomes.139  Most 
studies have found some impact,140 though usually either minor or confined to 
particular types of crime or particular religious denominations.   
A meta-analysis of 60 earlier U.S. studies of religiosity and crime, conducted by 
Baier and Wright in 2001, which for the most part excluded non-Christian 
subjects,141 lent support only to the moral community142 and anti-asceticism143 
theories.144 
                                                                
138Colin J. Baier & Bradley R.E. Wright, “If You Love Me, Keep My Commandments”: A 
Meta-Analysis of the Effect of Religion on Crime, 38 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 3, 3 (2001). 
139Some studies concluded that religious belief and observance have no impact on crime.  
See, e.g., Lee Ellis & Robert Thompson, Relating Religion, Crime, Arousal and Boredom, 73 
SOC. & SOC. RES. 132 (1989).  Other studies found a dominant impact.  See, e.g., Bruce 
Chadwick & Brent Top, Religiosity and Delinquency Among LDS Adolescents, 32 J. FOR SCI. 
STUDY RELIGION 51 (1993); John Rohrbaugh & Richard Jessor, Religiosity in Youth: A 
Personal Control Against Deviant Behavior, 43 J. PERSONALITY 136 (1975). 
140Even Rodney Stark, one of the authors of Hellfire and Delinquency, 15 years later 
recanted his position and announced that “religion has truly potent effects [on delinquency].”  
Rodney Stark, Religion and Conformity: Reaffirming a Sociology of Religion, 45 SOC. 
ANALYSIS 273, 273 (1984).  Stark recanted in dramatic fashion, in his presidential address to 
the Association for the Sociology of Religion. Id. 
141Baier and Wright claim, “[i]n analyses not shown here, we found that type of religion 
measure had no significant effect on studies’ estimation of the religion-crime association.”  
Baier & Wright, supra note 138, at 13.  A review of the 60 studies included in their meta-
analysis reveals that most if not all excluded Jews and other non-Christian subjects, making 
their claim dubious. Whether non-believers who regularly attend synagogue or mosque for 
social reasons, or believers who rarely set foot in a mosque or synagogue, would manifest the 
same tendencies as Christian church-goers and Christian believers to commit fewer crimes 
remains an open question.  
142The difference in crime between church members who go to church regularly and/or 
believe in the tenets of the church and church members who do not attend services or believe 
in church tenets is greater than the difference in crime between members of the general 
population in a generally secular region, the Pacific Northwest, who attend services and/or 
believe in religious tenets and members of the general population who do not.  This, Baier and 
Wright argue, supports the moral community hypothesis, that the deterrent effect of religion 
on crime is heightened by living among others who share one’s religiosity.  Id. at 14.   
143As predicted by the anti-asceticism theory, religious behavior and/or beliefs (again 
Baier and Wright fail to distinguish between them) exert a stronger deterrent effect on 
victimless crimes than on crimes against persons or property.  Id.  Other scholars have argued 
that this outcome confirms the secular social disorganization hypothesis, that the effect on 
victimless crimes “is the result of religious institutions acting in relative isolation to deter 
nonvictim crimes, whereas many social institutions, both religious and secular, act together to 
deter person and property crimes.”  Id. at 6 (citing Steven Burkett, Religiosity, Beliefs, 
Normative Standards and Adolescent Drinking, 41 J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 662, 663 (1980); 
Steven R. Burkett & Mervin White, Hellfire and Delinquency: Another Look, 13 J. FOR SCI. 
STUDY RELIGION 455 (1974)). 
144Baier and Wright also found that religious behavior and/or beliefs tend to exert a 
stronger deterrent effect on crime among women than men, and a stronger deterrent effect on 
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Most studies of religiosity and delinquency suffer from a Christian bias.  They 
largely represent the work of believers in the Hellfire Hypothesis, for whom the 
Hellfire and Delinquency findings “represented a formidable challenge . . . and thus 
inspired renewed research activity.”145  Overwhelmingly, their subjects have been 
Christians living in the United States, usually students.  Most have excluded non-
Christians from the results and have measured religiosity solely by church 
attendance.146 
The few studies on religiosity and delinquency that compare adherents of non-
Christian religions147 or non-Christians with Christians, all conducted outside the 
United States, provide only equivocal support for any of the theories of motivational 
religious law.  Israeli studies found that far fewer religiously observant Jews are 
imprisoned than non-religiously observant Jews,148 and that religiosity tends to 
reduce aggression among Jewish adolescents.149  However, a 1993 study in the 
                                                           
crime among non-whites than among whites.  Baier & Wright, supra note 138, at 15. 
145John K. Cochran & Ronald L. Akers, Beyond Hellfire: an Exploration of the Variable 
Effects of Religiosity on Adolescent Marijuana and Alcohol Use, 26 J. RES. IN CRIME & 
DELINQ. 198, 219 (1989).  Cochran and Akers implied that many or most of the believers in 
the Hellfire Hypothesis who conducted post-1969 studies that contradicted Hirschi and Stark’s 
findings were themselves committed Christians whose personal beliefs were challenged by 
what Hirschi and Stark found. 
146These studies also define the dependent variable, crime, inconsistently as including 
general index crimes (crimes against persons or property), victimless crimes, or both.  The 
crimes used in the studies have represented types of conduct prohibited by both religious and 
secular law, and the studies have relied extensively on self-reporting of criminal acts, a 
precarious method of gathering data about such conduct as domestic abuse and drug use. 
147One of the rare studies of the relationship between religiosity and delinquency to 
compare different non-Christian religions compared Jewish and Muslim adults in Israel, and 
found that while religiously observant Jews and Muslims are generally consistent with each 
other in their assessment of the seriousness of offenses, secular Jews and Muslims are 
inconsistent.  Sergio Herzog, Religiosity and Perception of Crime Seriousness by Jewish and 
Muslim Respondents in Israel, 24 DEVIANT BEHAV. 153 (2003).  For example, secular 
Muslims viewed shop robbery and apartment burglary as less serious than either secular Jews 
or religiously observant Muslims or Jews, but secular Jews viewed drug selling and illegal 
abortions as less serious than either secular Muslims or religiously observant Jews or Muslims. 
On the other hand, Muslims regard wife assault and tax evasion as less serious crimes than 
Jews, and among Muslims, the religiously observant actually regard wife assault as less 
serious than secular Muslims.  Id. at 163. 
148A study of Jewish male prisoners in Israel, where there is a clear division of the Jewish 
population into secular and religious groups, found that only 3.7%  of Jewish inmates were 
religiously observant compared to about 20% among the general population.  Sarah Ben-
David & Leonard Weller, Religiosity, Criminality and Types of Offences of Jewish Male 
Prisoners, 14 MED. & LAW 509 (1995). 
149Religiosity reduced all forms of aggression as well as victimization to physical 
aggression among girls, and reduced verbal and indirect aggression but not physical 
aggression among boys.  Age was the primary factor in reducing physical aggression among 
boys.  Jewish girls of Eastern (primarily Middle Eastern) origin displayed more aggression 
than Jewish girls of Israeli and Western origin, but among boys ethnic origin made no 
significant difference.  Simha F. Landau et al., The Effect of Religiosity and Ethnic Origin on 
Direct and Indirect Aggression Among Males and Females: Some Israeli Findings, 28 
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Netherlands by Junger and Polder of 12 to 17-year-old boys from four ethnic groups 
—Moroccans, Hindustanis, Creoles (Surinamese) and Dutch—did not support the 
notion that membership in a moral community reduces delinquency.150 
A pair of multinational studies using the same data reached different conclusions 
about the relationship between religiosity and crime.  Church attendance correlated 
negatively with tax fraud acceptability in 24 of the 37 nations,151 particularly in 
nations in which over 50% of the population is religiously affiliated, but in Japan 
religiosity showed no relationship to tax fraud acceptability.  Among residents of 
India and China, self-defined religiosity, but not formal religiosity, had a significant 
though weak relationship with the unacceptability of tax fraud.152  Yet, in a different 
study, frequency of prayer or meditation among Chinese respondents correlated 
positively with approval of buying stolen goods, failing to report a hit and run 
accident and drug use.153  The latter study, however, did not distinguish between 
respondents who consider themselves to be affiliated with a moral community and 
actively participate, and those who do not.   
                                                           
AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 281 (2002). 
150The authors used a three-factored scale of religiosity that included a question about 
attendance at the family’s place of worship and questions about parental prayer and parental 
religious attendance.  Marianne Junger & Wim Polder, Religiosity, Religious Climate, and 
Delinquency Among Ethnic Groups in the Netherlands, 33 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 416 (1993).  
While religiosity did affect delinquency within the moral community of Moroccan Muslims 
living in the Netherlands, the same was not true for Turkish Muslims or for Hindus from India, 
yet religiosity did reduce delinquency in the predominantly-secular Dutch Christian 
population.  Thus, in what one would expect to constitute moral communities of Turkish 
Muslims and of Hindus from India, religiosity was not linked to compliance with the law.  
Others studying this issue, however, have criticized the use of children as subjects due to their 
uncertain religiosity.  See Harold G. Grasmick, Karyl Kinsey & John K. Cochran, 
Denomination, Religiosity and Compliance with the Law: A Study of Adults, 30 J. FOR SCI. 
STUDY RELIGION 99-100 (1991).  Many children attend religious services because their parents 
want them to rather than out of personal religious commitment.  Turkish, Surinamese and 
Hindustani children living in the Netherlands appear to be more assimilated and from better 
educated families than Moroccans—26% of the Moroccan children in the study had lived in 
the Netherlands less than five years, compared with 12% among the Turks and 11% among the 
Surinamese, and 37% of Moroccan fathers never went to school compared to 11% of Turkish 
fathers in the Netherlands.  Immigrant parents, less assimilated than their children, may 
compel them to attend religious services in an attempt to preserve a connection to their 
homeland rather than out of religious conviction.  The Junger-Polder study loses force as a 
consequence.  Even if the study had used adult subjects, religious dress and observance of 
religious dietary laws and holidays would have been better criteria for measuring Muslim 
religiosity than mosque attendance.   
151Steven Stack & Augustine Kposowa, The Effect of Religiosity on Tax Fraud 
Acceptability: A Cross-National Analysis, 45 JOURNAL FOR THE SCI. STUDY OF RELIGION 325, 
347 (2006). 
152Id. at 346.  
153Stark, a co-author of the original Hellfire and Delinquency study, speculated that this 
correlation might have something to do with the fact that the religious sector in China is 
largely government-controlled and infiltrated, so that persons willing to acknowledge religious 
practice, except for a few brave souls, might tend to be unsavory characters.  Rodney Stark, 
Gods, Rituals, and the Moral Order, 40 J. FOR SCI. STUDY RELIGION 619, 624 (2001). 
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Among Christians, alcohol abuse has no statistically significant relationship to 
religiosity in any denomination.154  Religious homogamy, where spouses share 
religious affiliation, and frequency of church attendance are both inversely related to 
domestic violence.155  Parental religiosity reduces delinquency among the adolescent 
children of conservative Protestants if both parents share their religiosity, but this 
effect is significantly reduced if only one parent self-identifies as a conservative 
Protestant.156  However, the same study found adolescent boys generally tend to join 
in delinquency rather than avoid it when their parents are devoutly religious, though 
adolescent girls do not display the same tendency.157   
Overall, the data, though weak, suggest that delinquency correlates with 
religiosity among respondents who consider themselves to be affiliated with a moral 
community and actively participate, while persons unaffiliated with a moral 
community will be affected more by other factors even if they consider themselves 
religious individuals.158  Even this evidence is tainted by methodological problems, 
including a Christian bias in most studies.  Among adults, religiosity seems to reduce 
delinquency and the tolerance of delinquency to the extent that (a) the individual is 
affiliated with a religious community, (b) that religious community disapproves of 
the type of delinquent act at issue, and (c) the delinquent act at issue is not also 
resoundingly disapproved of by the larger society.  However, in predominantly 
Christian societies, the relationship between formal religiosity and reduction in 
delinquency is more tenuous than the relationship between self-identified religious 
belief and reduction in delinquency. 
                                                                
154Religiosity was measured by church or synagogue attendance, self-identification as 
“religious,” and membership in religious organizations.  E. Wilbur Bock, John K. Cochran & 
Leonard Beeghley, Moral Messages: The Relative Influence of Denomination on the 
Religiosity-Alcohol Relationship, 28 SOC. QUARTERLY 89 (1987).  Another study conducted in 
1970 concluded that church attendance had a more dramatic impact in reducing drinking 
among blacks than among white Protestants.  Paul C. Higgins, Gary L. Albrecht and Maryann 
H. Albrecht, Black-White Adolescent Drinking: The Myth and the Reality, 25 SOC. PROBS. 215 
(1977). 
155Christopher G. Ellison, John P. Bartkowski and Kristin L. Anderson, Are There 
Religious Variations in Domestic Violence?, 20 J. FAM. ISSUES 87 (1999). 
156Mark D. Regnerus, Linked Lives, Faith, and Behavior: Intergenerational Religious 
Influence on Adolescent Delinquency, 42 J. FOR SCI. STUDY RELIGION 189, 200 (2003).  
Regnerus measured religiosity by three criteria: attendance at religious services, religious 
affiliation (conservative Protestant vs. all others), and whether subjects considered religion 
“very important” or “not very important.” 
157Id. at 200. 
158Stack and Kposowa found that among religiously-affiliated individuals, religiosity, 
measured both by frequency of religious service attendance and by what they called “intrinsic 
religiosity,” had a significantly stronger negative relationship with tax fraud acceptability than 
among non-religiously-affiliated individuals.  Stack and Kposowa, supra note 151, at 347.  
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C.  Motivational Law’s Unfortunate Successes 
1.  Motivational Law, Authoritarianism and Repression 
While it is common wisdom that “institutionalizing the rule of law [is] a 
precondition to democracy,”159 institutionalizing the rule of motivational law can 
have the opposite effect.  Compelled by law to read censored news and propaganda, 
participate in mass rallies, and attend Hitler Youth meetings, the citizens of Nazi 
Germany were regimented through motivational law.  Surrounded by co-religionists 
doing and saying the same things, members of cults are susceptible to authoritarian 
control and indoctrination.  In the close-knit Mormon community of 19th century 
Utah, Mormon motivational laws on church attendance and on the treatment of and 
respect for church leaders preserved community cohesion but also reinforced the 
Mormon community’s exclusionary policy towards blacks for over one hundred 
years.160 
A similar dynamic can be seen in urban gangs, which one might call “immoral 
communities,” in which criminal acts may be viewed positively as a way to elevate 
an individual’s status within the group.  Institutionalizing the rule of law may be a 
precondition to democracy, but where the rule of law can also reinforce the 
totalitarian tendencies of a moral community, in which case institutionalization 
merely makes the misapplication of the rule of law more powerful. 
Motivational law is a morally neutral tool that can propel a community or a 
nation toward authoritarianism.  Authoritarian regimes use censorship laws to 
motivate citizens to comply with their dictates.161  Nazi laws requiring “Aryan” 
children to join the Hitler Youth served a motivational purpose of ensuring their 
indoctrination and obedience.  Islamic laws on hijab (modest dress for women) are 
motivational laws that exist to motivate men to obey laws forbidding adultery and 
molestation of women, but women who refused to conform to the stringent rules of 
the Taliban theocracy on the wearing of the burqa  were flogged regardless whether 
they were genuinely at risk of being adulterers or inspiring others to molest them.162  
                                                                
159Robert Eli Rosen, Complicating Law’s Legitimation Processes, 25 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 973, 977 (2000). 
160In 1863 Brigham Young pronounced it the “law of God in regards to the African race” 
that if a white Mormon man had sex with a black woman, “the penalty under the law of God is 
death on the spot. This will always be so." G.D Watt & J.V. Long, The Persecutions of the 
Saints-Their Loyalty to the Constitution-The Mormon Battalion-The Laws of God Relative to 
the African Race, 10 J. OF DISCOURSES DELIVERED BY PRESIDENT BRIGHAM YOUNG, HIS TWO 
COUNSELLORS [sic], THE TWELVE APOSTLES AND OTHERS 104–11 (1865).   Mormon religious 
law excluded blacks from the priesthood and temple ordinances until 1978, when church 
leaders claimed to have received a “revelation from God” discontinuing the practice. Spencer 
W. Kimball N. Eldon Tanner & Marion G. Romney, 148th Semiannual General Conference of 
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, Official Declaration 2 (Sept. 30, 1978), 
available at http://scriptures.lds.org/od/2. 
161See supra note 41. 
162Women in Afghanistan: The Violations Continue, AMNESTY INT’L, Oct. 30 1978, 
available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/ASA110051997ENGLISH/$File/ASA1100 
597.pdf (“In December 1996, Taleban[sic]-controlled Radio Voice of Shari’a announced that a 
group of 225 women had been rounded up and punished in Kabul for violating Taleban[sic] 
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Authoritarian regimes standardize and ritualize163 motivational laws into a talisman 
of power. 
Because religions tend to use motivational law to achieve compliance, one might 
predict that extremely religious individuals would display authoritarian tendencies.  
Adorno164 attributed several characteristics to the authoritarian personality, among 
them conventionality, intolerance of deviance, a desire to utilize state power to 
suppress nonconformity, distrust of human nature, belief that man is inherently evil, 
a belief that strong authority is needed to keep men’s evil drives in check, 
submissiveness to authority, and repressed sexuality coupled with a preoccupation 
with sex.  Religion and Adorno’s description of the authoritarian personality overlap 
in certain respects; for example, religions tend to adopt strong notions of 
conventionality and to be intolerant of deviance.165  Religions also tend to advocate 
submissiveness to authority; indeed, the word “Islam” means “submission,” referring 
to submission to Allah.   
                                                           
rules on clothing. The radio announcement warned women once again to wear the burqa and 
respect the Shari’a (Islamic law) or `face punishment’.  Sources state that punishment of the 
225 women consisted of being lashed on the back and legs after the sentence was handed 
down by a tribunal enforcing the Taleban[sic] interpretation of Islamic law. . . . On at least one 
occasion, such punishments have taken the form of bodily mutilation. A woman in the Khayr-
Khana area of Kabul in October 1996 was reported as having the end of her thumb cut off by 
the Taleban[sic]. This ‘punishment’ was apparently meted out because the woman was caught 
wearing nail varnish.”).  The tendency to ignore the motivational purpose of hijab and regard 
it as a talisman is not confined to Taliban Afghanistan or the Iranian theocracy. The debate 
within the European Union regarding hijab reflects confusion about the motivational purpose 
of hijab in Islam as well as the assumption that the motivational purpose is pretextual and that 
hijab has been hijacked by fundamentalists in Europe as a political symbol.  If hijab were 
regarded merely as a set of rules of modesty intended to motivate Muslims to resist the 
temptation to commit adultery or engage in premarital or extramarital sex, rather than as a 
declaration of identity as an Islamic fundamentalist, it is doubtful that it would have elicited 
such strong reactions.  “[T]he very construction of hijab issues as those of ‘religious identity’, 
sustained by the use of Article 9 ECHR as the primary legal basis for such cases, has given 
shape to a number of counterproductive trends. These are: deference to local knowledge 
(either the national courts’ or the school’s); obfuscation of Muslim women’s agency; explicitly 
antagonistic counter-positioning of the ‘conflicting priorities’ of ‘cultural diversity’ and 
‘gender equality’; and, less obviously, the moralistic fervour enfolding the debate.”  Anastasia 
Vakulenko, Islamic Dress in Human Rights Jurisprudence: A Critique of the Current Trends, 
7 HUM. RTS. L. REV.719 (2007). 
163I use the term “ritualized” in the sense in which it is used in the study of neurobiology 
and animal behavior, to refer to the evolution of a routine functional behavior into a signal or 
symbol.  See Sir Julian Huxley, A Discussion on Ritualization of Behaviour in Animals and 
Man, 251 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y  LONDON 249 (1966). 
164THEODOR W. ADORNO, THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY  (1950).  Adorno’s work has 
been exceedingly influential despite criticisms from both the right and the left.  See, e.g., J.J. 
Ray, The Old-Fashioned Personality, 43 HUM. REL. 997 (1990); J.J. Ray, Why the F Scale 
Predicts Racism: A Critical Review, 9 POL. PSYCH. 671 (1988); John L. Martin, The 
Authoritarian Personality, 50 Years Later: What Questions are There for Political 
Psychology, 22 POL. PSYCH. 1 (2001). 
165See J. Keith Abrams & L. Richard Della Fave, Authoritarianism, Religiosity, and the 
Legalization of Victimless Crimes, 61 SOC. & SOC. RES. 68, 70-71 (1976). 
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Consistent with this prediction, studies have found a strong correlation between 
authoritarianism and religious fundamentalism.166  As among studies of religiosity 
and delinquency, the Christian bias problem crops up in many of the studies, but a 
study of non-Christian subjects reached similar conclusions.167  However, studies that 
have examined the relationship among authoritarianism, Christian religious 
fundamentalism, and prejudice168 also have found that if authoritarianism is factored 
out, religious fundamentalism actually has an inverse relationship with prejudice.  In 
other words, non-authoritarian religious fundamentalists tend to be less prejudiced 
than non-authoritarian people who are not religious fundamentalists, while 
authoritarian religious fundamentalists tend to be more prejudiced than authoritarian 
non-fundamentalists.169 
2.  Cults and Concealment 
Motivational law seems to work most effectively in communities that use it 
pervasively, but membership in an insular moral community held together by 
pervasive motivational law also confers a degree of anonymity and immunity vis-à-
vis the outside world, and an incentive to protect the community by concealing 
wrongdoing.170  Such communities are susceptible to authoritarianism in their 
operation, and easily become cults.171  In cults, motivational laws become central to 
                                                                
166Bob Altemeyer & Bruce Hunsberger, Authoritarianism, Religious Fundamentalism, 
Quest, and Prejudice, 2 INT’L J. FOR PSYCHOL. RELIGION 113, 118 (1992) (defining 
“fundamentalism” as a style of belief that is characterized by a militant belief system, a sense 
of one absolute truth, and a sense of a special relationship with God); Bruce Hunsberger, 
Religious Fundamentalism, Right Wing Authoritarianism, and Hostility in Non-Christian 
Religious Groups, 6 INT’L J. FOR PSYCHOL.. RELIGION 39 (1996); L. Wylie & J. Forest, 
Religious Fundamentalism, Right Wing Authoritarianism and Prejudice, 71 PSYCHOL. REP. 
1291 (1992); Brian Laythe et al., Religious Fundamentalism as a Predictor of Prejudice: a 
Two-Component Model, 41 J. SCI. STUDY RELIGION 623 (2002). 
167Hunsberger, supra note 166. 
168The studies have focused on both racial prejudice and homophobia.  Studies regarding 
homophobia, like those regarding racism, have found right-wing authoritarianism to be related 
to prejudice.  Christopher R. Stones, Antigay Prejudice Among Heterosexual Males: Right-
Wing Authoritarianism as a Stronger Predictor than Social-Dominance Orientation and 
Heterosexual Identity, 34 SOC. BEHAV. PERSONALITY 1137 (2006); Wayne W. Wilkinson, 
Religiosity, Authoritarianism and Homophobia: a Multidimensional Approach, 14 INT’L J. FOR 
PSYCHOL. RELIGION 55 (2004); Jo-Ann Tsang & Wade C. Rowatt, The Relationship Between 
Religious Orientation, Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Implicit Sexual Prejudice, 17 INT’L J. 
FOR PSYCHOL. RELIGION 99 (2007). 
169Laythe et al., supra note 166, at 624. 
170Brietzke, supra note 112, at 350. 
171I use the term “cult” to refer to religious sects that are characterized by the following: 
(1) The sect demands total commitment from its followers, claiming all of their time, energy 
and thoughts and regimenting daily existence.  (2) The sect subordinates its followers to the 
authority of its leaders.  (3) Sect members are isolated from non-sect members, often living in 
a remote location and being cut off from outside communications.  See Note, 
Conservatorships and Religious Cults: Divining a Theory of Free Exercise, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1247, 1250-51 (1978). 
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members’ existence, with much time being consumed by ritual and other practices 
intended not only to motivate members to adhere to religious law, but to adhere to 
the law of the leader in matters of daily life. 
The evils of pervasive motivational law in religion are not limited to cults.  The 
problem of domestic abuse within the ultra-Orthodox Jewish community has largely 
gone unaddressed, though not unnoticed.172  Catholic priests who abused boys 
enjoyed immunity for years from the government and from civil liability, yet the 
religious laws governing the priesthood should have made them highly vulnerable to 
shaming.  They were able to persist in their abuses only because some in the Church 
hierarchy chose to keep the abuses a secret, placing avoidance of collective shame—
the reputation of the Church itself—above duty to the victims or their responsibilities 
under secular law.    
The tendency of motivational law to coincide with authoritarianism and 
concealment has structural underpinnings.  Motivational law can generate an 
organizational infrastructure the complexity of which corresponds to the complexity 
of the motivational laws themselves.  Complex prayer services and rituals require 
people to organize, administer and lead them, to train others to do so, and to decide 
issues that arise in the course of applying the motivational laws that mandate and 
govern them.  A well-organized and well-financed religious group has the means to 
take effective action vis-à-vis other populations.  If motivational laws work 
effectively within that group, the group’s organizational capacity can be energized 
and turned to extreme forms of action. 
Religious educational systems may elevate the risks of pervasive motivational 
law.  Major religions including Islam, Judaism and Catholicism have spawned 
elaborate systems of religious education, necessitated by the complexity of their 
religious legal systems, including motivational laws.  For Muslim children to learn to 
apply the Qur’an, Sunnah, ahadith and fiqh is a full-time task, as it is for Hasidic 
Jewish children to learn to pray in Hebrew and to apply the Tanach, the Talmud and 
the medieval codes and commentaries.  The need to learn complex motivational laws 
and practices contributes to the isolation of observant children from the mainstream 
of secular life. 
Pervasive motivational practices also contribute to the marginalization of 
Muslims and Orthodox Jews when they live as a religious minority among people of 
different religions.  Muslim women who wear hijab such as the Iranian chador and 
Afghan burqa,173 and traditional Orthodox174 Jewish men who wear yarmulkes and 
                                                                
172For a lengthy bibliography on this issue, see Marica Cohn Spiegel, Bibliography of 
Sexual and Domestic Violence in the Jewish Community, http://www.mincava.umn.edu/ 
documents/bibs/jewish/jewish.html#id2354008 (last visited Nov. 6, 2007).  
173Hijab is an Arabic term that refers to modesty in dress, including obligatory head 
coverings for married women.  See Mary C. Ali, The Question of Hijab: Suppression or 
Liberation, in THE INSTITUTE OF ISLAMIC INFORMATION AND EDUCATION BROCHURE SERIES, 
available at http://www.usc.edu/dept/MSA/humanrelations/womeninislam/whatishijab.html.  
The chador, a Farsi word, is a full-length semicircle of fabric, usually black, with a head 
opening traditionally worn by women in Iran.  The burqa is similar to a chador but has a mesh 
that covers the face.  See A Good Life: Lifting the Veil (Radio Netherlands Worldwide 
broadcast Jan. 21, 2003), available at http://www.radionetherlands.nl/features/development/ 
burqa030123.html.  
174There is a movement within Orthodox Judaism called “Modern Orthodoxy” in which 
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black hats and ritual fringes (tzitzit), do not assimilate easily into secular society in 
the West.  The frequent obligatory prayers—five times a day in Islam, three times in 
Judaism—also distinguish adherents of these religions from their peers in the 
workplace or wherever they may be when the time arrives for prayer.  In turn, 
because they remain marginalized populations—often immigrants, and ethnic and 
religious minorities—Muslims and Orthodox Jews are more likely to maintain their 
traditions and observe motivational laws, but motivational laws also keep them 
marginalized. 
3.  Ritualization and Standardization 
Motivational law easily can become ritualized, in the sense that it assumes non-
motivational functions that displace or are substituted for its original motivational 
purpose.175  Ritualized motivational law both exerts resistance to social change and 
can engender or exacerbate social, and even international, tensions. 
In a theocracy, ritualization creates an impetus toward standardization.  Where 
religious authorities control the coercive power of the government, line-drawing to 
decide whether motivational law has been violated becomes more critical since the 
decision now determines the administration of punishment.  Motivational law not 
only takes on new functions but is standardized. 
The wearing of hijab, for example, serves as a symbol of religiosity in Turkey, 
but in Iran it symbolizes allegiance to the existing Islamic political regime, enforced 
by religious police.  In such cases, ritualized motivational law on hijab slows the 
pace of social and religious change, becoming an instrument of oppression, yet may 
also inspire resistance among women who resent having what elsewhere is a 
motivational device forced upon them.  It also becomes necessary to prescribe what 
constitutes hijab.  In drawing lines, religious authorities, confronted with ambiguity 
regarding a commandment thousands of years old, tend to build what one Talmudic 
authority referred to as a “fence” around the divine rule;176 hence the burqa and 
chador become mandatory. 
Observance of motivational laws also takes on secondary meaning where 
religious identity is related to social status.  Often the same practices that are 
intended to engender motivation to comply with regulatory religious law are also the 
most visible to the world outside the moral community.  Indeed, their very visibility 
can be necessary to their effectiveness as a motivator.  One Jewish rabbi avoids 
“road rage” because the kippah—skullcap or yarmulke—on his head makes him “a 
representative of the Jewish people” and causes him to control himself.177  Similarly, 
Sikhs wear the “five K’s” to keep themselves under control, including kesh (uncut 
hair wrapped in a turban), kanga (ritual comb), kaccha (special underwear that is 
supposed to engender self-control), kara (a steel slave bangle to remind Sikhs to 
                                                           
adherents sometimes eschew the required head coverings and other motivational practices.  I 
use the term “traditional Orthodox” here to distinguish this movement. 
175See supra note 163. 
176THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Pirkei Avot (“Ethics of the Fathers”), 1:1.  The original 
language is, “Build a fence around the Torah,” meaning to err on the side of being overly strict 
in case of ambiguity regarding a Biblical—or in Islam, Koranic—commandment. 
177 Rabbi Alan Lew, quoted in ROSENBERG, supra note 2, at 38. 
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remember the Guru before taking action), and kirpan (a dagger to remind Sikhs to 
defend the weak against oppression).178 
A scene in the film Europa, Europa179 illustrates the relationship between 
motivational law and social status.  A Jewish boy passing himself off in Nazi 
Germany as an Aryan member of the Hitler Youth tries to reverse his circumcision to 
avoid detection.  The circumcision, originally a Biblical motivational law which like 
the commandment to wear ritual fringes180 was intended to remind Jewish males to 
keep God’s commandments,181 became in the Third Reich a deadly mark of inferior 
social status.  
Because observance of the requirements of motivational law is frequently the 
most visible manifestation of religious practice, such observance can mark the fault 
lines of religious conflicts, even where many members of the groups in conflict do 
not share in that observance.   Muslim men with full beards attract more hostility 
from bigots than Muslim men who are clean-shaven and wear suits.  Recent anti-
Semitic caricatures of Jews182 often portray them wearing a kippah or hat, a full 
beard,183 and sometimes, a ritual shawl (tallit) with fringes (tzitzit); observance of 
motivational law makes Jews targets. 
V.  A THEORY OF THE EFFICACY OF MOTIVATIONAL LAW 
A.  Conditions for Motivational Law to Improve  Compliance with Regulatory Law 
Motivational law seems to perform well as a motivator of compliance with 
regulatory law only if two conditions are met: (1) either the motivational law itself is 
enforced by sanctions and threat of sanctions sufficiently severe to have a deterrent 
impact or the motivational law is consistent with the self-interest of those being 
regulated,184 and (2) the linkage between the motivational law and regulatory law is 
evident to those persons who are supposed to comply with the motivational law.  
Failure of either condition can cause a failure of motivational law to achieve 
compliance with regulatory law. 
                                                                
178See generally BBC—Religion & Ethics—Sikhism: The Five Ks,  http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
religion/religions/sikhism/customs/fiveks.shtml (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).  
179EUROPA, EUROPA (Central Cinema Company 1990). 
180See supra notes 34-35. 
181See the discussion formerly available at http://www.jtsa.edu/community/parashah/ 
archives/5761/lekhlekha.shtml.  
182See, for example, those collected by Tom Gross, Cartoons from the Arab World,  
http://www.tomgrossmedia.com/ArabCartoons.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2007).  See also JOËL 
KOTEK & DAN KOTEK, AU NOM DE L'ANTISIONISME: L'IMAGE DES JUIFS ET D'ISRAËL DANS LA 
CARICATURE DEPUIS LA SECONDE INTIFADA [IN THE NAME OF ANTIZIONISM:  THE IMAGE OF JEWS 
AND ISRAEL IN CARICATURE SINCE THE SECOND INTIFADA] (Éditions Complexe 2003).  
183Traditionally observant Jewish men, like Muslim men, grow beards.  Ultra-Orthodox 
boys wear payos, forelocks.  
184In terms of cognitive dissonance theory, individuals must first establish a commitment 
to the behavior required by motivational law.  Unless they have a predisposition to that 
behavior, they will not establish the necessary commitment without compulsion by the threat 
of sanctions.  See supra Part III.B. 
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The examples given earlier in this Article of motivational laws that fail to 
accomplish their purpose can be explained by failure of one of these conditions.  For 
example, there is no punishment associated with making a gratuitous promise.  The 
risk of punishment for violating obscenity laws is mild at best, given the difficulty of 
prosecution,185 and those who produce or perform in pornography typically see no 
connection between their conduct and rape or sexual abuse.186  Violations of religious 
motivational laws in Western democracies carry no penalty other than a divine one 
that has credence mainly among those who would comply with those laws anyway.  
Punishment for violating military disciplinary rules is far more certain, but the 
linkage between obeying a rule to keep one’s bunk neat or to salute a superior officer 
and overcoming fear of death to obey an order to advance on the battlefield may 
seem tenuous to many soldiers.  If a debtor fails to obtain a briefing on available 
credit counseling before filing a bankruptcy petition, the debtor’s bankruptcy case 
can be dismissed, but a 2006 study of credit counseling funded by the Consumer 
Federation of America and American Express and conducted by professors from 
Georgetown and Purdue Universities found an increased likelihood of a subsequent 
bankruptcy or derogatory public record among people who obtained credit 
counseling compared to others with the same credit bureau risk scores who did not 
obtain credit counseling.187 
If these two conditions are satisfied, on the other hand, motivational law can act 
as a stepping stone to, or reinforcement of, compliance with regulatory law.  
Typically, violations of motivational law are regarded as less egregious and are 
punishable by lesser sanctions than regulatory law.  For instance, a teenaged boy in 
Nazi Germany would not suffer quite so severely for failure to comply with a law 
requiring his attendance at Hitler Youth meetings—a law aimed at motivating him to 
submit to the military training and indoctrination to obey orders that the Hitler Youth 
organization administered—as he would for disobeying an order once he was drafted 
and put on the battlefield.  The flogging of women in Taliban Afghanistan and 
Ahmadinejad’s Iran who fail to comply with a version of hijab mandating that they 
                                                                
185Melanie Pearl Persellin, Note, Sticks and Stones May Break My Bones, But Your Words 
are Sure to Kill Me: a Case Note on United States v. Alkhabaz, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1038 
(2001) (“In general, obscenity prosecutions are quite rare due to the difficulty in establishing 
material as obscene under the Miller test . . . .” (citing Blake T. Bilstad, Obscenity and 
Indecency in a Digital Age: The Legal and Political Implications of Cybersmut, Virtual 
Pornography, and the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 321, 370 (1997))).  
186One article quotes adult video producer Veronica Hart, “I’m not sending out the 
message to a bunch of guys that it’s okay to go out and abuse chicks because that’s what they 
really want. . . . Even when the chick wants . . . to be taken by a bunch of guys, it’s very clear 
in my movies that it’s her wish.”  Sean Hannon Williams, The Parallel Trends of Increased 
Adult Content in Mainstream Media and Harder Core Pornography: A Tale of Market 
Failure? 1 THE CARCERAL NOTEBOOKS 61, 71 (2006) (emphasis in the original), available at, 
http://www.thecarceral.org/pornography.pdf. 
187MICHAEL E. STATEN & JOHN M. BARRON, EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CREDIT 
COUNSELING 25 (May 31, 2006), http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Credit_Counseling_Report 
061206.pdf, (last visited Nov. 14, 2007) (“[E]ven after controlling for risk scores at the outset, 
the regression model estimates . . . indicate that those who visited a counseling agency had an 
increased likelihood of a subsequent bankruptcy or derogatory public record.”). 
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completely cover themselves in order to avoid arousing men to entice them into 
adultery or to commit rape or sexual abuse, is far less severe than the supreme 
punishment meted out to women who commit adultery, and in the perverse logic of 
fundamentalist Islam, women often are blamed, and punished severely, even for their 
own rape and abuse.188 
B.  The Allure of Motivational Law as “Regulation Lite” 
Motivational law often fails to improve compliance with regulatory law, yet 
lawmakers nevertheless find it alluring.  Lawmakers commonly perceive 
motivational law as a stepping stone to compliance with regulatory law, as 
“regulation lite.”  It is a way to improve the odds of securing compliance with 
regulatory law by compelling people to engage in behavior by which they remind 
themselves of their obligations under regulatory law, or by developing a habit of 
complying with a class of commands that includes regulatory commands of a similar 
form or emanating from the same source of authority.   
Motivational law not only is perceived as heightening the odds of compliance 
with regulatory law; it also is less onerous and subjects people to lesser punishment 
in case those commands are not obeyed.  It is both easier and less risky to compel 
soldiers to attend drills in which they are trained to obey orders, and to fine them or 
confine them to quarters if they don’t show up, than it is to shoot them if they 
disobey an order in battle. 
Yet, motivational law also provides cover in case of a failure of regulatory law.  
A municipal legislator wishing to appear tough on rape and sexual abuse may 
propose an anti-obscenity ordinance, then when the incidence of rape and sexual 
abuse remains high, point to it as evidence the legislator took action.  In religious 
communities, a defrauder may maintain a reputation for righteousness by virtue of 
his compliance with the laws of his religion on religious dress, diet and ritual, or by 
coming to church every Sunday, using as camouflage motivational laws that are 
supposed to motivate him to obey religious and secular laws that require honesty.189 
                                                                
188See Asifa Quraishi, Her Honor: An Islamic Critique of the Rape Laws of Pakistan From 
a Woman-Sensitive Perspective, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 287, 288-90 (1997) (according to 
fundamentalist Islamic doctrine, absent four male eyewitnesses to a woman’s having been 
raped, the victim is presumed to have had consensual sex out of wedlock, making her an 
adulteress (zina) subject to punishment by imprisonment or the death penalty); S. Douki et al., 
Violence Against Women in Arab and Islamic Countries 6 ARCHIVES WOMEN’S MENTAL 
HEALTH 165, 165 (2003) (attributing indifference to domestic abuse in Islamic countries to 
“attitudes that domestic violence is a private matter and, usually, a justifiable response to 
misbehaviour on the part of the wife.”); Manar Waheed, Note, Domestic Violence in Pakistan: 
The Tension Between Intervention and Sovereign Autonomy in Human Rights Law, 29 BROOK. 
J. INT’L L. 937, 946 (2004) (“any disobedience or even rumor of disobedience is enough to 
dishonor a man and killing that symbol of disobedience will restore a man’s honor”). 
189In one case in the 1980s handled by the author’s law firm, a businessman made a stir in 
his local Jewish community by pledging, in a very public forum, a million dollars for Israel.  
Using the reputation for uprightness he had gained by seeming to comply with Jewish laws on 
tzedakah (charity), he convinced many members of that community to invest in a limited 
partnership of which he was general partner.   The limited partners later discovered the 
partnership was insolvent and that the businessman had misappropriated partnership funds.  
Finally, they learned the businessman had never honored his million-dollar pledge for Israel.  
Then, and only then, did they sue him.  
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Both because enforcing motivational law is less onerous than having to enforce 
regulatory law and because it cloaks a lawmaker with the appearance of having tried 
to improve compliance with regulatory law, lawmakers often use motivational law 
even in contexts in which there is little or no evidence that it actually works.  I have 
discussed several examples—obscenity laws appear to have little effect on the 
incidence of rape and sexual abuse of women, the requirement of consideration for 
contracts does not prevent people from making contracts that they don’t really intend 
to perform, the credit counseling requirement for consumer bankruptcy does not 
seem to make debtors more likely to honor their contractual obligations in the future, 
and compliance with religious rules on church attendance has only a marginal effect 
on the incidence of violation of criminal laws among church-goers.  Yet, in each of 
these cases, those who make and construe the law have opted to use motivational 
law. 
Despite its limited efficacy in most cases, motivational law holds particular 
appeal among religions, which generally use it more extensively than secular 
authorities.190  Lacking the power to punish adherents through formal sanctions in 
most cases, religious authorities rely heavily on rules regarding religious liturgy and 
ritual, dress and diet both to reinforce moral communities and to motivate people to 
comply with religious regulatory laws.191  These rules, however, have much more 
powerful impact in contexts, such as most Islamic countries, in which motivational 
law is enforceable through sanctions imposed by the state. 
C.  Motivational Law’s Innate Conservatism 
Motivational law is inherently a conservative force.  Codifying motivational 
practices and enforcing them with sanctions makes them difficult to change.  As 
discussed above,192 motivational law functions in part through reinforcement of the 
moral community in the face of modernity and rapid social change.  People are more 
easily motivated to comply with rules that are consistent with existing norms and 
practices.  When motivational law is employed to alter existing norms or to attempt 
to motivate people to comply with the commands of an authority that is otherwise 
regarded as illegitimate, it usually functions poorly, unless enforced by strong and 
credible sanctions as in cults.  For this reason, motivational laws often have 
secondary meaning, identifying those who comply with them as supporters of the 
status quo within the moral community or reference group. 
This conservatism is rooted in part in the cognitive tendency to idealize the past.  
People tend to rate past events more positively than they rated them when the event 
occurred (“rosy retrospection” or the “positivity effect”).193  People also tend to 
                                                                
190Use of motivational law in religion has ancient roots.  See supra Part II.B.3. 
191See supra Part II.A, for the distinction between motivational and regulatory laws.  
Religious regulatory laws include, for example, most of the Ten Commandments, and other 
rules governing the relationship between people and between people and their environment.  
192See supra Part IV.C.3. 
193Terence R. Mitchell & Leigh Thompson, A Theory of Temporal Adjustments of the 
Evaluation of Events: Rosy Prospection & Rosy Retrospection, in 5 ADVANCES IN 
MANAGERIAL COGNITION AND ORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION PROCESSING 85, 85-114 (Chuck 
Stubbart et al. eds., 1994); Mara Mather & Laura L. Carstensen, Aging and Motivated 
Cognition: The Positivity Effect in Attention and Memory, 9 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 496 
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remember their choices as better than they actually were (“choice-supportive 
bias”).194 
Most of the examples of motivational law given in Part II.B of this Article 
manifest this conservative tendency.  Obscenity laws, laws prohibiting abortion 
counseling, credit counseling requirements for bankrupt debtors, laws establishing 
the privileges of royalty, military disciplinary rules, and censorship laws all reflect 
conservative values.  Motivational rules of the common law requiring formalities 
such as consideration or seal of the promisor for a binding contractual promise, the 
holographic will in lieu of witnesses, and the formalities of Roman civil law such as 
those required for the fiducia cum creditore195 that are still reflected in the secured 
credit laws of many civilian jurisdictions,196 seem quaint relics of the distant past 
though they remain in use today.  Efforts to use motivational law to rehabilitate 
offenders have been only marginally successful,197 perhaps because they attempt to 
use a tool best suited for preserving normative behavior to alter the behavior of 
people whose norms are different. 
Motivational law’s conservatism also manifests itself in religion.  “Give me that 
old time religion” is sung in many Protestant churches.  Hasidic Jewish movements 
continue to require their members to dress in the manner of 17th century Eastern 
European Jews, and practice a version of Jewish liturgy from the same period.  Al 
Qaeda and its affiliates motivate their followers to commit acts of what they call 
                                                           
(2005). 
194Mara Mather & Marcia K. Johnson, Choice-supportive Source Monitoring: Do Our 
Choices Seem Better to Us as We Age?, 15 PSYCHOL. & AGING 596 (2000).  
195George Long, Mancipium, in A DICTIONARY OF GREEK AND ROMAN ANTIQUITIES 727 
(William Smith ed., London, John Murray 1875), available at http://penelope.uchicago.edu/ 
Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/secondary/SMIGRA*/Mancipium.html; George Long, Fiducia, in A 
DICTIONARY OF GREEK AND ROMAN ANTIQUITIES 536 (William Smith ed., London, John 
Murray 1875), available at http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/secondary/ 
SMIGRA*/Fiducia.html 
196See Arnold S. Rosenberg, Where to File Against Non-U.S. Debtors: Applying UCC §9-
307(c) [Rev] to Foreign Filing, Recording, and Registration Systems, 39 UCC L.J. 109, 255-
57 (2006). 
197See, e.g., Doris Layton MacKenzie et al., An Experimental Study of a Therapeutic Boot 
Camp: Impact on Impulses, Attitudes and Recidivism, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 221 
(2007) (explaining that boot camp releasees had marginally lower recidivism than releasees 
from prison, and the difference became insignificant when antisocial attitudes or anger 
management problems were added to the model predicting recidivism); James A. Wilson & 
Robert C. Davis, Good Intentions Meet Hard Realities: An Evaluation of the Project 
Greenlight Reentry Program, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 303 (2006) (stating that 
intervention participants performed significantly worse on multiple measures of recidivism 
after one year); Sheldon X. Zhang & Lening Zhang, An Experimental Study of the Los Angeles 
County Repeat Offender Prevention Program: Its Implementation and Evaluation, 4 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POLICY 205 (2005) (stating that juvenile offenders provided with 
treatment showed lower recidivism rate than control group only for the first six months after 
release); Margaret P. Spencer, Sentencing Drug Offenders: The Incarceration Addiction, 40 
VILL. L. REV. 335, 378 (1995) (“The field of intermediate sanctions is relatively new and there 
is no proven successful sanction for low-level drug offenders.”). 
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martyrdom in the struggle to restore the 7th and 8th century caliphate, which they 
regard as a divine command. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Motivational law exists, and prevailing theories of law do an inadequate job of 
explaining it.  Motivational law often lures lawmakers as an alternative or 
supplement to coercive enforcement of regulatory laws, but without enforcement of 
the motivational law itself through sanctions or threat of sanctions, it is unlikely to 
succeed in increasing compliance with regulatory laws.  Even with enforcement 
through sanctions or threat of sanctions, motivational law will fail if its linkage to 
regulatory law and favorable outcomes is perceived as weak by those who are its 
subjects.  When motivational law does work, it works primarily by establishing a 
commitment to compliant behavior and strengthening the moral community, 
allowing peer group influence to reinforce that commitment.   
Inherently a conservative force, motivational law is susceptible to abuse by 
authoritarian regimes, which use censorship laws and forced indoctrination to 
consolidate their power.  However, motivational law acts as a conservative force in 
the common law tradition as well, reflected in such doctrines as the consideration 
requirement for contract formation, the rule against admissibility of evidence of 
subsequent repairs, and the formalities to make a will.  Even due process has a 
motivational purpose: to maintain the legitimacy of the judicial process so as to 
motivate citizens to accept and obey the judgments and orders it produces. 
Religions in democratic countries, lacking coercive power, often use motivational 
law, though Christianity, a faith-based rather than law-based religion, makes less use 
of it than Islam and Judaism.  This disparity in use of motivational law lies at the 
core of tension between Islam, rich in motivational law rendered rigid in theocracies 
through ritualization and standardization, and the predominantly Christian secular 
democracies.  Religious motivational laws, such as church attendance and religious 
ritual, dress and diet, must be either enforceable through sanctions or clearly 
connected to favorable outcomes for those to whom they apply, or they will atrophy.  
Once individuals are committed to religious observance, however, both shaming and 
the information processing described by cognitive dissonance theory, screening out 
information that fails to support that commitment, will tend to preserve religious 
observance. 
New Governance theory and “soft law” similarly rely on motivation mediated 
through regulatory communities.  Regulatory communities, however, give the 
impression of cronyism.  When government regulators develop a bond of trust with 
the industries they regulate, outsiders distrust them for it, and the government’s 
legitimacy suffers.  To the extent that it relies on motivational law not enforceable 
through sanctions, New Governance may decay into cronyism and will damage the 
legitimacy of the regulatory process.  
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